



























A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Philosophy) 











Professor Elizabeth S. Anderson, Chair 
Associate Professor Sarah Buss 
Associate Professor Anna R. Kirkland 

























Doris May Hinds 













































I thank Elizabeth Secor Anderson. 

I thank Stella Botchway & Mark Morris Bernard Green, 

Linda Shultes, Molly Mahony, Sarah Buss, Anna Kirkland, & Peter Railton, 

Lorrel Rose Coleman, Michael Silvera Hinds, Vanessa Coleman, Linda Amanda 
Victoria Campbell, Ryan Eleseo Augustus Campbell, & Lydia Eleanor Campbell. 

'If people of color are to "do" philosophy, philosophers must be willing to "do" people 
of color. When we give minorities' issues their due we dignify them as moral agents 

































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                                                                            
DEDICATION                                                                                                           ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                                                                         iii       
LIST OF TABLES                                                                                                        v 
 
CHAPTER 
1. Social stigmatisation: 'a social tyranny' 
The chief mischief of the legal penalties        1 
They strengthen the social stigma        31 

2. Encounters that count: 'a foundation for solid friendship'                                   
The real remedy for breaking caste is inter-marriage             60 
Another plan of action for the abolition of caste is to begin with inter-caste dinners 81 

3. White right: 'a right to avoid'  
We have a right to avoid it                                                                                      103 
A right to avoid blacks?                                                                                          113 











LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Miscegenation                                                                                           6 
Table 2. Social tyranny                                                                                           46  
Table 3. Kukathas's right to exit                                                                             116 
Table 4. Wellman's right to exclude                                                                      117 
Table 5. White's white expectation                                                                       119 



































Social stigmatisation: 'a social tyranny' 

1.1.0. The chief mischief of the legal penalties 

 In his essay On liberty, in its second chapter, On the liberty of thought and 
discussion, John Stuart Mill tells us that  

'[f]or a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they 
strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so 
effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of 
society is much less common in England, than is, in many other countries, 
the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment'.  

This string of words is the stimulus for the first section of this doctoral dissertation. 

 In this first section, I aim to answer the following question: What was 'the chief 
mischief of the legal penalties' against miscegenation? First, I shall define each 
element of this question, namely 'the chief mischief', 'miscegenation', and 'the legal 
penalties'. Second, I shall show how—both in the official reasons for repeal of those 
penalties and in the presumed legacy of Loving v. Virginia (i.e. in the presumed legacy 
of the case, in 1967, in which the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) 
launched that repeal)—the answer to the question has been taken to be 
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'discrimination'. Third, I shall argue that what Mill says, in the words I quoted in the 
previous paragraph, about 'legal penalties' enacted and enforced, by those who have 
legal power, against 'those who disown the beliefs they deem important', is also true 
of 'legal penalties' against miscegenation: their 'chief mischief' is, in fact, that they 




1.1.1. Definitions  
  
1.1.1.1. The chief mischief 

 For Mill, 'mischief' is a matter of 'do[ing] harm to', 'bring[ing] evil upon', and 
'becom[ing] a burthen on' persons other than oneself (1859: 4.8). Mill thinks any 
action that amounts to 'mischief' is morally wrong, because it 'detract[s . . . ] from the 
general sum of good' (1859: 4.8). According to Mill's utilitarian moral theory, 
'pleasure is good', 'happiness is [ . . . ] pleasure', and 'actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness' (1861b: 2.2). 

 However, since a single action may be a 'mischief' in many different ways, 
'the chief mischief' of any action will be that mischief, which 'would detract more 
from the general sum of good', than would any other mischief that results from the 
action. Mill offers at least two examples of what, in his opinion, is correctly described 
as 'the chief mischief'. First, in the opening paragraph of his essay On the subjection 
of women, Mill tells us that 'the principle which regulates the existing social relations 
between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong 
itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement' (1869: 1.1). 
Second, in the closing paragraph of his essay on The negro question, Mill denounces 
Thomas Carlyle's (1849) Occasional discourse on the negro question as a 'speech 
against the "rights of Negroes"' (1850: 1). Mill says that 'the owners of human 
flesh[ . . . ] will welcome such an auxiliary' as Carlyle, who 'by thus acting, [ . . . ] 
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has made himself an instrument of  [ . . . ] "a true work of the devil"'. Mill says he 
'hardly know[s] of an act by which one person could have done so much mischief as 
this may possibly do' (1850: 15).  

 Thus, Mill thinks that '[t]he subjection of women' (1869) and 'the matter of 
negro slavery' (1850: 15) each constitute a mischief that is correctly described as 'the 
chief mischief'. For this reason, Mill's concept of 'the chief mischief' recommends 
itself as a philosophical tool to launch an analysis of the injustice that besets persons 
who experience life at the intersection (Crenshaw 1989) of these two chief mischiefs: 






 According to Peggy Pascoe (2009: 13), in her What comes naturally: 
Miscegenation law and the making of race in America, '[b]etween 1864 and 1967, 
lawmakers and their supporters routinely called laws that banned interracial sex and 
marriage "anti-miscegenation" laws'. In addition to the decision of the SCOTUS, in 
Loving, in 1967, Pascoe refers to 1864— five years after Mill's publication of On 
liberty—when, in a satirical pamphlet, entitled Miscegenation: The theory of the 
blending of the races, Applied to the American white man and the negro, David 
Goodman Croly coined the new word that these 'lawmakers and their supporters' 
adopted. Croly (1864: ii) coined the noun 'miscegenation', by drawing upon 'the 
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Latin Miscere, to mix, and Genus, race, [ . . . ] to denote, the abstract idea of mixture 
of two or more races'. Similarly, Croly defined the verb 'to miscegenate' as 'to mingle 
persons of different race'.  

 In fact, Croly coined two neologisms. For, 'as the particular subject under 
discussion limits, in a certain view, the races that are to be intermingled', Croly 
coined a more specific neologism, 'to express the idea of the union of the white and 
black races'. The more specific neologism, 'Melaleukation' or 'Melamigleukation', is 
'derived from two Greek words, viz.: Melas (μέλας), black; and Leukos (λευκός), 
white. The word Mignumi (μίγνυμι), to mix, is understood'. Croly's ultimate objective 
was to introduce, into public discourse, the more specific neologism. On 29th 
September 1864, the 'Author of "Miscegenation"' wrote anonymously to President 
Abraham Lincoln, enclosing a copy of the book, 'in the hope that, after you have 
perused it, you will graciously permit me to dedicate to you another work on a 
kindred subject, viz. "Melaleukation". In the first work I discuss the mingling of all 
races which go to form the human family; but my object in the new publication is to 
set forth the advantages of the blending of the white and black races on this 
continent'.  

 However, Croly's first work does exactly what he promised would be done in 
his second. Nor did Croly's second work ever appear. Yet, the more specific 
neologism was not adopted by 'lawmakers and their supporters'. We might tempted 
to attribute this to the fact that, as Croly concedes, the more specific neologism is 'ill 
adapted for popular use', not least because of 'its difficulty of pronunciation'. Yet, 
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according to Vern L. Bullough and Bonnie Bullough, '[t]he survival of 'miscegenation' 
[as opposed to the alternative, more specific, neologism] undoubtedly owed much to 




 What type of 'mixture', 'mingl[ing]', or 'union' of 'the white and black races 
on this continent' did Croly, these 'lawmakers[,] and their supporters', most deem to 
be 'bad'? To answer this question, we must first establish what types of miscegenation 
there are. Distinguish biological from relational miscegenation; each comprises two 
varieties. Since only some, not all, heterosexual intercourse results in children, 
biological miscegenation might be either simply sexual or both sexual and 
procreative. By contrast, relational miscegenation might be vertical (and, likely, 
hierarchical) or horizontal (and, possibly, egalitarian). Vertical miscegenation includes 
cross-racial adoption, which is marked by parental authority and filial subordination; 
horizontal miscegenation includes cross-racial companionship, which is marked by 
the equal status of each companion. 











 There are two distinct strands of argument in Miscegenation, namely, an 
argument from 'equality' and an argument from 'superiority': 'The equality of the race 
is acknowledged far and wide. Its superiority in many of those characteristics which 
enter into the beau ideal of true manhood, is unquestionable' (1864: 48). This tension 
in Croly's text is evident from the very first paragraph, in which Croly gives two 
distinct refinements of 'the abstract idea of mixture of two or more races'.  

 On the one hand, his argument from 'superiority' begins from the premise that 
'miscegenation' is 'the blending of the various races of men' (1864: 1). From this 
premise, Croly argues for the procreatively sexual 'blending of blood' (1864: 18). He 
argues '[t]hat the mingling of diverse races results in a positive benefit to the progeny. 
That in the millenial future, the most perfect and highest type of manhood will not be 
white or black, but brown, or colored, and that whoever helps to unite the various 
races of men, helps to make the human family the sooner realize its great 
destiny' (1864: 51–52).  

 On the other hand, his argument from 'equality' begins from the premise that 
'miscegenation' is 'the practical recognition of the brotherhood of all the children of 
the common father' (1864: 1). On this horizontally relational view, miscegenation is 
'the realization of the common brotherhood' (1864: 54); to miscegenate is to 






 According to Véronique Munoz-Dardé, in her article Fraternity and justice, 
'political philosophy is very much concerned with liberty and equality, but 
considerably less so with fraternity. Always somewhat eclipsed by the other two 
values, fraternity has undergone neither the formal treatment initially generated by 
Berlin's distinction between "positive" and "negative" liberty, nor the analytical effort 
to define the term similar to Williams', Nagel's, or Dworkin's approach to 
equality' (1999: 81). For this reason, it is startling that, as far as Croly is concerned, 
'[t]o free ['the negroes'] is to recognize their equality with the white man' (1864: 50); 
it is startling that Croly invites us to 'pray that [ . . . ] we stand with ['this persecuted 
race'] on the broad and solid ground of justice, equality, and fraternity' (1864: 48). It 
is startling that, for Croly, freedom is fraternity. 

 However, the approach to fraternity taken by Croly differs from that taken by 
Munoz-Dardé. Like John Rawls, who dismissed 'ties of sentiment and feeling [ . . . ] 
between members of the wider society' as 'unrealistic', and who declared that 
'fraternity [ . . . ] imposes a definite requirement on the basic structure of 
society' (1971: 106), Munoz-Dardé insists that her 'interpretation of fraternity is 
recommended as a moral perspective for political institutions, not as a principle 
citizens have to apply in every moment and moral decision of their life' (1999: 94). 
By contrast, Croly argues that 'we should recognize the great doctrine of human 
brotherhood, and that human brotherhood comprehend[s . . . ] the provision for [the] 
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entrance [of 'the negro'] into those family relations which form the dearest and 
strongest ties that bind humanity together' (1864: 58).  

 In this debate, Mill sides with Croly. In his review of George Grote's Plato and 
the other companions of Sokrates, Mill says he thinks it is a 'fact that the idea and 
sentiment of virtue have their foundation not exclusively in the self-regarding, but 
also, and even more directly, in the social feelings'. Mill observes that this 'fact' is 'a 
truth first fully accepted by the Stoics, who have the glory of being the earliest 
thinkers who grounded the obligation of morals on the brotherhood, the συγγένεια, 
of the whole human race' (1866a: 55). Furthermore, in a letter—dated 7th December 
1868—Mill assures John Candlish that he will 'not lose the feeling which [his] three 
years in Parl[iamen]t have given [him], of brotherhood in arms with those who are 
still there fighting the battles of advanced liberalism'. In another letter—dated 24th 
June 1862— Mill employed the same phrase, to thank John Elliott Cairnes for writing 
The slave power: 'when I read anything you write, [ . . . ] I feel growing up in me, 
what I seldom have, the agreeable feeling of a brotherhood in arms. This feeling 
being one of the pleasantest which life has to give'. Not only is this feeling 'one of the 
pleasantest', it is also, politically speaking, one of the most powerful. That Mill thinks 
so is clear from an entry—dated 24th January 1854—in his Diary: 'If we suppose 
cultivated to the highest point the sentiments of fraternity with all our fellow beings, 
past, present, and to come, [ . . . ] this system of cultivation [ . . . ] would suffice both 
to alleviate and to guide human life'. Inadequate cultivation of 'the sentiments of 
fraternity' is what, Mill seems to think, constituted injustice 'in the Slave States of 
America' and 'among the feudal nobility'. In his essay on Whewell's moral 
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philosophy, Mill denounces the fact that 'the slavemasters and the nobles [ . . . ] felt 
themselves "bound" by a "tie of brotherhood" to the white men and to the nobility, 
and felt no such tie to the negroes and serfs' (1852: 51). This lack of a cross-racial 
'feeling of a brotherhood in arms' is bad, thinks Mill, because, as he asserts, in his 
Vindication of the French Revolution of February 1848, in reply to Lord Brougham 
and others, it is one of the 'moral axioms' that 'every one of the living brotherhood of 
humankind has a moral claim to a place at the table provided by the collective 
exertions of the race' (1849: 73).  

 Croly puts Mill's belief that each person enjoys 'a moral claim to a place at the 
table' in terms of each person's fitness for fraternity. Croly observes that 'the influence 
of slavery must have been, in many instances, to degrade the negro far below his own 
standard in all the better attributes of man, and thus to render him unfit for marriage 
with the better classes' (1864: 52). Yet, despite this observation, Croly asserts that 'the 
negro[ . . . ] ha[s] all the qualifications which would fit him to be the companion of 
his white brother' (1864: 63). Whether 'the negro['s]' fitness for fraternity should be 
understood as 'his' fitness for 'marriage' or 'his' fitness for 'companion[ship]' is moot. 

1.1.1.3. The legal penalties 

 Penalties are 'the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control' (1869: 1.9). Penalties cause harm: Mill speaks in the same 
breath 'of pains and penalties' (1859: 1.10). Thus, an individual 'suffers these 
penalties' and 'may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others' (1859: 4.5).  
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 Mill distinguishes legal and social penalties. According to Mill's distinction, 
when society applies 'social penalties' to an individual (1859: 2.17), it is 'punishing 
him, [ . . . ] by general disapprobation' (1859: 1.11), and it uses 'the moral coercion 
of public opinion' (1859: 1.9). By contrast, when society applies 'legal penalties' to 
an individual, it is 'punishing him, by law' (1859: 1.11), and it uses 'the means [of] 
physical force' (1859: 1.9). 

 However, Mill's examples diverge from his distinction: they suggest a broader 
conception of what it is to be a legal penalty. Mill offers three examples of legal 
penalties: (a) that of being 'sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment', (b) that 
of being 'rejected as jurymen', and (c) that of being 'denied justice against a thief', of 
'refusal of redress' (1859: 2.18). Only the first of these uses 'the means [of] physical 
force' (to restrain the human body). The latter two use the means of bureaucracy (to 
impede the physically free human body in its pursuit of its goals).  

 Similarly, in his decision in Loving, Justice Warren (1967: 4) identifies three 
examples of legal penalties that Virginia attached to cross-racial marriage: (a) 
imprisonment, (b) lack of legal recognition of one's status as 'wife' or 'husband', and 
(c) lack of recourse to legal remedies. Warren gives the name of 'penalty' only to the 
first: 'Section 20-59[... of the Virginia Code] defines the penalty for miscegenation: 
[ . . . ] confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years'. 
Indeed, 'Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man' had been 
'sentenced to one year in jail'—a sentence which 'the trial judge [had] suspended [ . . 
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. ] for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not 
return to Virginia together for 25 years' (1967: 2). This, indeed, used 'the means [of] 
physical force'. Yet, the latter two examples—rendering 'marriages [ . . . ] absolutely 
void without any decree of divorce'—each use the means of bureaucracy. The virtue 
of Mill's broader conception of what it is to be a legal penalty means that Mill would 
also consider these to be 'the legal penalties' against miscegenation. 

 Warren tells us that legal '[p]enalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to 
slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period' (1967: 6). 
European enslavement of persons racialised-as-negro began with the kidnapping, by 
the Portuguese explorers Antão Gonçalves and Nuno Tristão, of ten Africans, near 
Cabo Branco, in 1441. European competitive colonisation of the planet began with 
Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas, in 1492. In the 500-year-long period 
of negro slavery and planetary colonisation, almost all the competing European 
slaving nations—not just the British in Virginia—imposed legal penalties on cross-
racial marriage between persons racialised-as-negro and persons racialised-as-white.  

 However, very few of these imperial jurisdictions conjoined those legal 
penalties with legal prohibitions against cross-racial marriage. Yet, according to Mill's 
definition of 'the legal penalties', a legal penalty need not be accompanied by a legal 
prohibition, but can, instead, be accompanied by a legal permission. This is an 
advantage of Mill's definition, because it correctly identifies as 'the legal penalties' 
against miscegenation many of the laws that nevertheless permitted cross-racial 
marriage between persons racialised-as-negro and persons racialised-as-white. 
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Indeed, most imperial jurisdictions conjoined legal penalties against cross-racial 
marriage with legal permissions to marry cross-racially. Sometimes, cross-racial 
marriage was legally penalised by requiring that the parties to the marriage obtain 
official permission, before embarking upon it. At other times, cross-racial marriage, 
although legally permitted, was legally penalised, by conspicuously failing to extend 
to it a legal benefit that was enjoyed by marriages that were not cross-racial. For 
examples of such penalties conjoined with permissions in the British Empire (both in 
Australia and, before 1985, in South Africa), see Ellinghaus (2001: 209n2) and 
Badenhorst, Hendrickse, and Nowbath (1985: 6); for those in the Spanish Empire, see 
Stolcke (1989: 11); for those in the Portuguese Empire, see Boxer (1963: 98 & 121); 






1.1.2.1. Reasons for repeal: Discrimination by the state 

 In his review, Law of libel and liberty of the press, Mill criticises '[Francis 
Ludlow] Holt's celebrated treatise on the Law of Libel' (1825a: 72). According to 
Mill, Holt (1812) had made the 'declaration, that nothing must be done tending to 
lessen the reverence for the laws: that to whatever degree a law may be bad, its 
badness shall not be suffered to be exposed, nor any representation to be made 
which shall convince the people of the necessity for its repeal'. Mill disagreed. 
Instead, Mill argued that, '[t]o obtain reform, you must point out defects' (1825a: 
108). Indeed, Elizabeth S. Anderson, in her book The imperative of integration, argues 
that this principle constitutes a methodology: 'Nonideal theory begins with a 
diagnosis of the problems and complaints of our society and investigates how to 
overcome these problems' (2010: 6). We are interested in what is worthy of 
complaint, because the social phenomena it is worth our complaining about are the 
raw material of any philosophy that aims to respond adequately to our less than ideal 
social and political world. What 'badness', what 'defects', or what 'complaints' about 
the legal penalty against cross-racial marriage were officially 'point[ed] out' and, 
ultimately, 'convince[d] the people of the necessity for its repeal'?  

 Legal repeals are associated more with legal prohibitions, than with legal 
permissions. I have found no evidence to confirm that those imperial jurisdictions 
that conjoined legal penalties with legal permissions ever repealed those permissions. 
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For this reason, I focus on the repeals of legal penalties conjoined with legal 
prohibitions. I have found legal penalties conjoined with legal prohibitions only in 
French imperial jurisdictions (i.e. (1)  in French Louisiana, (2) in Metropolitan France, 
and (3) in the Napoleonic Empire) and in British imperial jurisdictions (i.e. in South 
Africa and in what is now the USA). 

 French imperial jurisdictions, although they declared such legal penalties on at 
least three occasions—i.e. (1) in Article 6 of the Code Noir (1724), (2) in the Arrêt du 
Conseil d'état du Roi concernant les mariages des noirs, mulâtres, ou autres gens de 
couleur, du 5 avril 1778, and (3) in the Dictionnaire général de police civile et 
judicaire de l'empire français (Léopold 1813)—executed the repeal of these legal 
penalties discreetly, without recording any official argument. For instance, the most 
explicit reference to the act of repeal that Jennifer Heuer (2009: 545), who conducted 
a thorough search of France's Archives Parlementaires, was able to uncover, was the 
following report, from 1819: 'Your committee, said M. Broglie, has ensured that the 
King's government has destroyed the effects of the ministerial circular which the 
petitioner is complaining about, and has sworn in the future to conform to existing 
laws that do not forbid such marriages, and, as a consequence, your committee 
invites you to return to the business of this meeting's agenda' (Archives 
Parlementaires 1873: 51, translation mine). Doubtless the motivation here was to 
ensure that no official responsibility was taken for the injustice of the legal penalties 
that were repealed. Yet, this practice renders it all the more morally confusing why 
these legal penalties were so bad or defective as to need repeal. 
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 British imperial jurisdictions were more forthcoming. For instance, South 
Africa repealed its legal penalties with an official argument concluding that those 
legal penalties were not unjust! When F. W. de Klerk, then the Minister for Internal 
Affairs, introduced the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Amendment 
Act, 1985, to repeal the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949, he was acting on 
the recommendation of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act. In that report, the Chairman of 
Joint Committee, Piet J. Badenhorst, offers three distinct 'grounds' for why his 
'Committee [ . . . ] recommends that the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949, [ . 
. . ] be repealed': first, the Act 'cannot be justified on scriptural or other grounds'; 
second, 'since [the Act was] placed on the Statute Book, provision has been made for 
group ordering by way of the classification of the population into groups, the 
determination of own residential areas, the attendance of own educational 
institutions and the right to vote on a group basis, and these measures sufficiently 
ensure the continued social, educational and constitutional ordering of own 
communities'; and, third, the Act is 'of a discriminatory nature in that [it] do[es] not 
provide for equal treatment of the various population groups, but single[s] out one 
identifiable population group only' (Badenhorst, Hendrickse, & Nowbath 1985: 6). 

 The first ground is an assertion, rather than an argument. One wants to know 
what the 'scriptural or other' premises were that were found to be false. More 
importantly, the first ground is negative, rather than positive. One wants to know not 
why specific justifications of the Act failed, but what ground justified the Act's repeal. 
Badenhorst seems to offer this to us, in his third ground: South Africa's legal penalties 
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for cross-racial marriage are ripe for repeal because they are 'of a discriminatory 
nature'. This third argument echoes the official argument that was recorded some two 
decades earlier, by the SCOTUS, in the USA. We may reconstruct the argument of 
Warren's opinion, thus: 

1. 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the 
States' (1967: 10). 
2. 'Virginia is [as of 1967] one of 16 States which prohibit and punish 
marriages on the basis of racial classifications' (1966: 6). 
3. 'The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white 
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own 
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy' (1966: 11). 
4. Legal 'measures designed to maintain White Supremacy' are 'official state 
sources of invidious racial discrimination'. 
Therefore, from 2, 3, and 4, 
5. It is 'invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification' (1966: 11). 
Therefore, from 1 and 5, 
6. '[T]hese statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment' (1966: 2). 

Virginia's legal penalties for cross-racial marriage were ripe for repeal because they 
constituted 'official state sources of invidious racial discrimination'. 
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 However, this is where any similarity between South Africa and the SCOTUS 
ends. For, they interpret 'discrimination' in contrasting ways. Whereas Badenhorst 
found that South Africa's legal penalties 'do not provide for equal treatment of the 
various population groups', the SCOTUS found that Virginia's legal penalties 'deny to 
[ . . . ] person[s] within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws' (italicisation mine). Furthermore, whereas Badenhorst drew his conclusion 
about lack of 'equal treatment' on the basis that South Africa's legal penalties 'single 
out one identifiable population group only', the SCOTUS explicitly rejected this 
argument: 

'Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes, as 
expressed in the words of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to Preserve Racial 
Integrity," extends only to the integrity of the white race. While Virginia 
prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the exception for 
the descendants of Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial 
class may intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend 
that this distinction renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes arbitrary and 
unreasonable even assuming the constitutional validity of an official 
purpose to preserve "racial integrity." We need not reach this contention 
because we find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state 
purpose to protect the "integrity" of all races' (Warren 1967: 11–12n11, 
italicisation mine). 

The SCOTUS rejected this argument, because it rejected what this argument 
conceded: 'the constitutional validity of an official purpose to preserve "racial 
integrity"'. To have conceded this, would have been to have validated the way 'White 
Supremacy' sustains its supremacy: by '[p]reserv[ing . . . ] the integrity of the white 
race'. Notably, Badenhorst embraced this argument, because he embraced what this 
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argument conceded: 'the continued social, educational and constitutional ordering of 
own communities'—which is euphemism for the continued 'White Supremacy' of 
South African Apartheid. Thus, Badenhorst undercut the argument of his third ground 
with the argument of his second ground and his official report equivocated between 
two reasons for repealing South Africa's legal penalties: the injustice of those 
penalties, and their redundancy, given the effectiveness of other unjust legal 
penalties. The fact that South Africa interpreted 'discrimination' so very differently 
from the SCOTUS, whose eighteen-year-old reason for repeal was—internationally—
the only precedent it had to work from, should give us pause for thought. If these two 
jurisdictions could not agree on what 'the chief mischief' was, yet could agree that it 
was called 'discrimination', should we not be suspect of whatever goes, in their 
arguments, by the name of 'discrimination'? Even if we are not suspicious, there is 
good reason for thinking that discrimination by the state was not 'the chief mischief 
of the legal penalties' against miscegenation. 

1.1.2.2. Legacy of Loving: Discrimination by persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-women 

 Ralph Richard Banks argues that repeal was not enough. Banks finds the 
legacy of Warren's repeal to be worthy both of note and of complaint. Nevertheless, 
like Warren, what Banks finds worthy of complaint is 'discrimination'—this time not 




1.1.2.2.1. The most noteworthy feature of the post-Loving period 

 In an article, The aftermath of Loving v. Virginia: Sex asymmetry in African 
American intermarriage, Banks argues that '[t]he most noteworthy feature of the post-
Loving period is [ . . . ] the sustained low intermarriage rate of black women, 
especially in light of the demise of antimiscegenation laws and the increased 
opportunity for interracial contact' (2007: 533–534). Banks's argument for the 
superlative noteworthiness of this 'feature of the post-Loving period' is that, 'to the 
extent that the symbolism of Loving itself could have influenced marriage behavior, 
the opinion might have been expected to spur interracial marriage by black women. 
After all, Richard Loving was white and his bride, Mildred Jeter, was black. The 
Lovings embodied the possibility of love and marriage between a black woman and a 
white man' (2007: 536, italicisation mine).  

 In his more recent monograph, Is marriage for white people?: How the African 
American marriage decline affects everyone, Banks makes a normatively stronger 
assertion, calling this 'a puzzling phenomenon', because 'the intermarriage rate for 
black women should have increased dramatically during the 1960s and '70s' (2011: 
118–119, italicisation mine). Banks's argument for this stronger assertion is—partially, 
but primarily—the fact that '[t]he Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia
—a case involving the marriage of a black woman to a white man—invalidated the 
prohibitions of interracial marriage that remained on the books in more than a dozen 
states. After Loving, interracial marriage became legal throughout the United 
States' (2011: 117–118). (Banks's use of the connective 'also' shows that the second 
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reason he gives has secondary importance: 'The intermarriage rate for black women 
should also have been spurred by the fact that black women were much more likely 
than black men to interact with members of other races at school or work' (2011: 
118).) 

 Presumably, for Banks, that which had become legal should have occurred 
and should have occurred with high frequency. Yet, it has occurred only infrequently. 
As evidence of this 'feature of the post-Loving period', Banks cites data that the Pew 
Research Center captured in a report, Marrying out: One-in-seven new U.S. marriages 
is interracial or interethnic, which 'analyzes trends in intermarriage through the lens 
of each of the nation's four biggest racial/ethnic groups—whites, blacks, Hispanics 
and Asians' (2010: 9). Within this data, Banks seems to distinguish three distinct 
facets of this 'feature of the post-Loving period':  

1.1.2.2.1.1. Persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women cross-racially marry 
less often, than persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-men. 

 'In 2008', Banks tells us, 'fewer than one in ten black female newlyweds 
married across racial lines, which makes them less than half as likely as black men to 
marry someone of a different race' (2011: 116). Banks cites the Pew Research Center, 
which found that '[s]ome 22% of black male newlyweds in 2008 married someone of 
a different race or ethnicity, compared with 8.9% of black female newlyweds that 
same year' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 11).  
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 Commenting on this statistic, Banks notes that 'Black men now intermarry 
more than twice as frequently as black women, but that gender gap is not long-
standing. [ . . . ] In fact, according to United States Census data, in 1960 there were 
slightly more interracially married black women than interracially married black men' 
(2011: 117). To be precise, in 1960, 'there were twenty-six thousand black women 
married to white men, and twenty-five thousand black men married to white women' 
(2011: 273n239, citing U.S. Census Bureau 1998). 'Then', Banks tells us, 'over the 
next few decades, as rates of interracial marriage increased throughout society, an 
interracial marriage gap developed between black men and women. That gap has 
widened with each decennial census. Now, there are more than half a million 
interracially married black men, and only two hundred thousand interracially married 
black women' (2011: 117). 

 Note that the vast majority of these cross-racial marriages are to persons 
racialised-as-white: '[a]mong Blacks Who Out-Married in 2008[, . . . n]early six-in-
ten of each gender married a white spouse. Close to a quarter of black women (24%) 
and 22% of black men married a Hispanic person. A small minority married an Asian 
spouse (7% for men and 6% for women), and the rest married someone in the "other" 
category. [ . . . ] "Other" includes American Indian, two or more races and "some 
other" races' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 13). 

1.1.2.2.1.2. Persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women cross-racially marry 
less often, than persons racialised-as-neither-black-nor-white. 
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 In a context where, in general, only persons gendered-as-women are legally 
permitted to marry persons gendered-as-men, it is illuminating to look at the sum of 
marriages that involve persons gendered-as-men and, among those marriages, to 
compare the proportion involving persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women 
with the proportion involving persons gendered-as-women-and-racialised-as-other-
than-black. The Pew Research Center's report provides us with the relevant data. First, 
look at cross-racial marriages that involve persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-
men. 'Among whites who out-married in 2008, [ . . . m]ore than a quarter of white 
men (27%) married an Asian woman, and about 7% married a black woman'; 46% 
of 'white men married a Hispanic person' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 10, 
italicisation mine). Second, if we look at cross-racial marriages that involve persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-Hispanic-men, the phenomenon is similar. 'More than 
eight-in-ten (83%) Hispanic men who out-married in 2008 married a white spouse', 
5.3% 'married an Asian', and 'just 5% of Hispanic male newlyweds' 'married a black 
spouse' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 15, italicisation mine). Again, if we look at 
cross-racial marriages that involve persons racialised-and-gendered-as-Asian-men, 
the phenomenon is similar. 'Among Asian newlyweds who intermarried in 2008', 
71% of 'Asian men' 'married a white person', 'the proportion marrying a Hispanic 
spouse' was 18%, and only 5% 'marr[ied] someone who is black' (Passel, Wang, & 
Taylor 2010: 19). From this data, we can conclude that persons racialised-and-




 Importantly, this is a gendered conclusion and the converse is not generally 
true. That is to say, it is not generally true that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-men cross-racially marry less often, than persons gendered-as-men-and-
racialised-as-other-than-black. The Pew Research Center's report provides us with the 
data that shows this, from the perspective of persons gendered-as-women. The report 
shows that among 'Asian newlyweds' the converse is true, but not among 'white 
newlyweds' or 'Hispanic newlyweds'. Thus, '[a]mong Asian newlyweds who 
intermarried in 2008', 77% of 'Asian women' 'married a white person', 'the 
proportion marrying a Hispanic spouse' was 10%, and 5% 'marr[ied] someone who 
is black'. By contrast, '[a]mong whites who out-married in 2008', 51% 'of white 
women [ . . . ] married a Hispanic person', '20% of white women married a black 
man, while just 9% married an Asian man' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 10). 
Moreover, '[a]mong Hispanic newlyweds who intermarried in 2008', '78% of 
Hispanic women' 'married a white spouse', 'some 13% married a black spouse', and 
4% 'married an Asian' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 15). 

 A comparison of the two previous paragraphs seems to suggest that persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-Asian-men stand in relation to persons gendered-as-
women-and-racialised-as-other-than-Asian as persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-women stand in relation to persons gendered-as-men-and-racialised-as-other-
than-black. Banks argues that this apparent similarity is deceptive: 'Commentators 
sometimes compare the low intermarriage rate of black women to that of Asian men; 
these groups are thought to be disadvantaged in the relationship market by 
stereotypical images depicting Asian men as soft and effeminate and black women as 
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strong and masculine. But even Asian men intermarry at considerably higher rates 
than black women. Asian American men born in the United States are three or more 
times as likely to marry interracially as are black women' (2011: 116). Banks cites the 
Pew Research Center, which reported that, in 2008, '8.9% of black female 
newlyweds married someone who was not black' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 12). 
By contrast, '[a]mong the estimated 186,000 Asian newlyweds in 2008, [ . . . ] 19.5% 
of Asian men' 'married someone of a different race/ethnicity' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 
2010: 17) and, in that same year, 41% of 'Native' 'Asian men' had 'married someone 
of a different race/ethnicity in the past 12 months' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 35). 
Thus, persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women fare worse than even the 
worst-faring category of persons gendered-as-men-and-racialised-as-other-than-black. 

1.1.2.2.1.3. Persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women cross-racially marry 
less often, than persons racialised-as-white. 

 However, '[p]erhaps the starkest evidence of the intimate segregation of black 
women', Banks tells us, 'emerges not in contrast to other minority groups as much as 
in comparison to whites. Usually, the smaller a group, the more frequently its 
members intermarry. This is a straightforward matter of numbers. For members of 
smaller groups there are more potential spouses outside of the group than in. The 
situation is reversed for members of the largest groups. Thus, in the United States, 
whites have long had lower intermarriage rates than members of any minority group'. 
Yet, '[b]y some measures the intermarriage rate of black women is now no higher 
than that of whites' (2011: 116–117). Banks does not cite a source for this data, but 
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he is likely referring to two findings of the Pew Research Center: first, that, of those 
currently married in 2008, '4.7% [of 'all whites'] were married to someone of a 
different race or ethnicity' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 9), and '5.5% of married 
black women' had 'a non-black spouse' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 11); and, 
second, that, of those newly married in 2008, 'nearly one-in-ten (8.9%) ['white 
newlyweds'] married a nonwhite spouse' (Passel, Wang, & Taylor 2010: 9) and '8.9% 
of black female newlyweds' 'married someone of a different race or ethnicity' (Passel, 
Wang, & Taylor 2010: 11). According to Banks (2011: 117), '[t]his is an extraordinary 
development, and one that bolsters the conclusion that black women are more 
segregated in the intimate marketplace than any group in American society'. 

1.1.2.2.2. The most complaint-worthy feature of the post-Loving period? 

 However, Banks does not merely think that this 'feature of the post-Loving 
period' is worthy of note. More importantly, Banks thinks that it is worthy of 
complaint. In the absence of 'official state sources of invidious racial discrimination', 
Banks complains about the discriminatory choices of persons racialised-and-
gendered-as-black-women. Banks asserts that these discriminatory choices constitute 
a complaint-worthy harm to persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women—the 
very persons who are making these choices! Banks offers two arguments for this 
assertion. First, 'some black women marry down rather than marry out'. This fact, 
Banks thinks, 'leave[s] black women with men who share their race but not much 
else'. It renders 'black couples [ . . . ] mismatched'. Second, 'other black women 
remain unmarried rather than partner with a man of another race'. This fact, Banks 
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thinks, burdens them with the 'hazards of the single life—unsatisfying and 
nonmonogamous relationships, the increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases, 
abortion, single parenthood' (2011: 120). 

 Yet, these discriminatory choices might not, on balance, be worthy of 
complaint. First, 'marry[ing] down' might not be a serious harm, and so might not be 
worthy of complaint. Certainly, being 'mismatched' is a harm, but the thought that it 
is a serious harm might simply be a prejudice of the rich. Indeed, in her article Is 
marriage for rich people, Nancy Leong asks: 'Why do we view marrying someone 
who is less educated, less wealthy, or both, as marrying down?'. Leong is 'concerned 
that Banks overstates the undesirability of such pairings in a manner not entirely 
different from those who assume problems inherent in interracial marriages. [ . . . ] 
Banks does with class what he accuses others of doing with race' (2011: 1320). 
Second, 'remain[ing] unmarried' might not be a serious harm, and so might not be 
worthy of complaint. Certainly, the lack of a partner and an unplanned pregnancy 
can be harmful, but they might be less harmful than marriage. Anita LaFrance Allen-
Castellitto, in her article, Women and their privacy: What is at stake?, observes that 
'women's often-unreciprocated, often-subservient caretaking functions with respect 
to their husbands have denied them both the opportunity for solitude and the ability 
to enjoy and exploit the modicum of privacy their lives as wives and mothers 
afforded'. This observation suggests that non-marital exclusive sexual partnerships 
and even 'single parenthood' could better furnish a person gendered-as-woman with 
the sort of '[s]olitude [that] contributes to the process of self-definition and 
personality development' (1984: 243). 
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 Furthermore, these discriminatory choices might, in fact, be worthy of 
celebration. To see this, it is crucial to think about the good reasons a person might 
have for making these discriminatory choices. Broadly, there are three types of good 
reason. It might be  

(1) a matter of priorities: she has prioritised a felt duty  
(a) to persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-men,  
(b) to families that have been racialised-as-black, or  
(c) to cultures that have been racialised-as-black.  

Banks (2011: 132–142) gives voice to persons who raise these reasons in his chapter, 
Desire. Alternatively, it might be  

(2) a matter of pessimism, either about  
(a) whether each family and, more generally, society is sympathetic 
to such cross-racial relationships,  
(b) whether each family and, more generally, society is sympathetic 
to cross-racial motherhood and cross-racial children, or  
(c) whether persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men possess  
(i) the cultural capital to understand cultures racialised-as-
black,  
(ii) the perceptual tools to discern the racial injustice that 
besets such cross-racial relationships, or  
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(iii) the coping mechanisms to deal with the racial injustice 
that besets such cross-racial relationships.  

Banks (2011: 143–169) gives voice to persons who raise these reasons in his chapter, 
Fear. Finally, it might be  

(3) a matter of politics. This political reluctance might be either  
(a) in protest against how persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-
men have sexually exploited persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-women, in the past, or  
(b) to protect herself from experiencing similar sexual exploitation, 
in the present.  

 This last reason is, I suspect, the most important, as Allen-Castellitto suggests: 
'When a Jewish friend told me she would not consider marrying a non-Jew, I knew 
exactly what she meant: she does not trust Gentile men, just as some of my black 
women friends do not trust white men' (2000: 198). Indeed, Imani Perry goes so far 
as to argue that Banks 'pays too little attention to the history of nonconsensual and 
exploitative sexual relationships between white men and black women that may be 
the root of many black women's reluctance' (2011: 11). Yet, Perry's accusation is, I 
think, incorrect. Pace Perry, Banks is aware of 'a long-standing practice of white men 
taking sexual liberties with black women' (2011: 144); he notes that '[m]any black 
women associate white men's attraction to them with the twisted sexual relationships 
that often developed between master and slave' (2011: 152); and he reminds us that 
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'the black feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins has memorably written, "Freedom for 
Black women has meant freedom from White men, not the freedom to choose White 
men as lovers"' (2011: 138, citing Collins 2000: 162).  

 However, Banks's defence against Perry's accusation reveals an even deeper 
flaw in his argument. Banks's real error is in how he expects persons racialised-and-
gendered-as-black-women to respond to this phenomenon: 'If fears of interracial 
intimacy keep people separate now, it is because those fears embody the echo of the 
past. Many of us continue to act out the roles we first began to inhabit long ago. We 
scarcely stop to consider that we might change the script' (2011: 169). Banks 
assumes that it is within the power of persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women unilaterally to 'change the script'. In her article Don't lecture black women 
about marriage, Latoya Peterson (2011) argues that it is not within their power 
unilaterally to do this. 'Falling black marriage rates aren't the result of black women 
"being picky"', Peterson argues, 'but of the complex politics of attraction'. Indeed, 'to 
imply that black women being closed-minded is the reason for the current state of 
affairs is grossly simplifying the complex politics of attraction, particularly in societies 












1.2.0. They strengthen the social stigma 

1.2.1. Its stigma might remain 

 In her book, Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times, Jasbir 
Puar draws a racial link between two sexual cases decided by the SCOTUS. 
Commenting on Lawrence v. Texas, which, in 2003, legalised homosexual sodomy in 
the USA, Puar observes that Loving 'is rarely mentioned in relation to Lawrence-
Garner, which [ . . . ] could as easily be apprehended for its interracial as for its 
sexual implications' (2007: 130). Puar refers to the fact that, contrary to popular 
belief, 'the case involves an interracial pairing: a white man [Lawrence] and an 
African American man [Garner]'. Like Puar, I think that Loving is rarely mentioned—
and should more often be mentioned—in relation to Lawrence. However, unlike 
Puar, I think the failure to draw this connection between these two cases 
impoverishes our apprehension not only of Lawrence, but also of Loving. Thus, I urge 
us not to apprehend Lawrence 'for its interracial [ . . . ] implications', but rather to 
apprehend Loving for its stigmatising implications. To this end, let us reflect 
philosophically on the following words from Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence: 
'If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains 
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unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not 
enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons'. 

 Although philosophers sometimes speak of 'stigma', they short-change us on a 
definition of 'stigma'. For example, in his article, Shame, stigma, and disgust in the 
decent society, Richard J. Arneson defines 'stigma' with a particularly disappointing 
lack of rigour. Arneson places the word 'stigma' in apposition both with 'detectable 
marks of shame' (2007: 37) and with 'a visible mark of reproach' (2007: 48). 
However, these two definitions are at odds with each other. First, not every 'mark' 
that is 'detectable' is also 'visible'—any detective could have told Arneson that. 
Second, traumatic experiences are not the same as malicious intentions. The phrase 
'of shame' suggests that the origin of the 'detectable marks' lies in the emotional state 
of the stigmatised person. By contrast, the phrase 'of reproach' suggests that the origin 
of the 'visible mark' lies in the intentional action of the person doing the stigmatising. 
Third, and most importantly, an action is correctly said to generate a stigma not (a) 
because the victims of the action feel bad, or (b) because the perpetrators of the 
action intended harm, but rather (c) because the action is reasonably interpreted, by 
an onlooker, as expressing disrepute.  

 Indeed, by focussing upon the interpretations that it is reasonable for any 
onlooker to reach, I shall argue that, according to Mill, in social stigmatisation, a 
story to explain separation is built out of badges and remains as the mainstream way 
of communicating about human bodies. Although I agree with Banks that repeal was 
not enough, in contrast to both Banks and Warren, I shall argue that those legal 
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penalties were ripe for repeal because they strengthened social stigmatisation. That, 
pace Warren, was why those legal penalties were worthy of complaint. Furthermore, 
since those legal penalties were not the source of this social stigmatisation, but rather 
a strengthening of it, repeal of those legal penalties was not enough to dismantle the 
social stigmatisation. On the contrary, social stigmatisation subsists: as a story with 
increased standing in public discourse. As Peterson correctly pointed out, we can 
observe social stigmatisation at work, today, 'in societies that value some types of 
beauty more highly than others'. A salient example of this is a society in which the 
SlutWalk is generally understood as a protest against the oppression of persons 
gendered-as-woman, but in which persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women 
cannot afford to participate, because the public presentation of their human bodies is 
reasonably interpreted as expressing disrepute. I argue that this phenomenon is a 
'social tyranny', which enslaves these persons, with respect to their public reputation. 
That, pace Banks, is why the legacy of Warren's repeal is worthy of complaint. Repeal 
is not enough, because repeal is not destigmatisation. 

1.2.1.1. A story to explain separation . . . 

'In what does beauty consist? In richness and brightness of color, and in 
gracefulness of curve and outline. What does the Anglo-Saxon, who 
assumes that his race monopolizes the beauty of the earth, look for in a 
lovely woman? Her cheeks must be rounded, and have a tint of the sun, her 
lips must be pouting, her teeth white and regular, her eyes large and bright; 
her hair must curl about her head, or descend in crinkling waves; she must 
be merry, gay, full of poetry and sentiment, fond of song, childlike and 
artless. But all these characteristics belong, in a somewhat exaggerated 
degree, to the negro girl. What color is beautiful in the human face? Is it the 
blank white? In paintings, the artist has never portrayed so perfect a woman 
to the fancy, as when choosing his subject from some other than the 
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Caucasian race, he has been able to introduce the marvelous charm of the 
combination of colors in her face. Not alone to the white face, even when 
tinted with mantling blood, is the fascination of female loveliness imputed. 
The author may state—and the same experience can be witnessed to by 
thousands—that the most beautiful girl in form, feature, and every attribute 
of feminine loveliness he ever saw, was a mulatto. By crossing and 
improvement of different varieties, the strawberry, or other garden fruit, is 
brought nearest to perfection, in sweetness, size, and fruitfulness. This was a 
ripe and complete woman, possessing the best elements of two sources of 
parentage. Her complexion was warm and dark, and golden with the heat 
of tropical suns, lips full and luscious, cheeks perfectly moulded, and tinged 
with deep crimson, hair curling, and "Whose glossy black / To shame might 
bring / The plumage of raven's wing." (italicisation mine) 

 Croly (1863: 36) tells this story under the title 'THE MISCEGENETIC IDEAL OF 
BEAUTY IN WOMAN'. This story suffices to support Peterson's suggestion that laws 
penalising miscegenation arose 'in societies that value some types of beauty more 
highly than others'. In short, the story 'in [such] societies' is that '[t]he "happy mean" 
between the physical characteristics of the white and black, forms the nearest 
approach to the perfect type of beauty in womanhood' (Croly 1863: 37). However, 
this is not the whole of the story. On the contrary, it is only half of it.  

 According to the story thus far, 'the negro girl' is 'so perfect a woman to the 
fancy'; to her is 'imputed', by 'the Anglo-Saxon', 'the fascination of female 
loveliness'; it is when 'the Anglo-Saxon [ . . . ] saw' what he took to be 'a mulatto', 
that he concluded he had seen 'the most beautiful girl in form[ and] 
feature' (italicisation mine). Croly's words emphasise the sexual desire of 'the Anglo-
Saxon' for what he perceives to be the bodily appearance of persons to whom he has 
'imputed' the titles of 'the negro girl' or of 'a mulatto'. This emphasis contrasts 
strongly with what, only six pages later, Croly has to say about 'THE WHITE 
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DAUGHTERS OF THE SOUTH' (1863: 42). In this contrasting chapter, Croly's 
emphasis is placed on his contention that '[a] platonic love, a union of sympathies, 
emotions, and thoughts, may be the sweetness and grace of a woman's life, and 
without any formal human tie, may make her thoroughly happy' (1863: 43). Croly 
encourages us to draw the following conclusion: On the one hand, persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women are fit for sex. On the other hand, persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-white-women are fit for legal marriage or social 
companionship. By implication, persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women 
are not fit for legal marriage or social companionship. This implication is an instance 
of social stigmatisation. 

 The activity of social stigmatisation is the activity of explanatory story-telling. 
According to Anderson (2010: 7–10), the story told seeks to explain the fact that 
some persons group themselves separately from other persons. They group 
themselves separately, because they have attained dominant control over some good 
that is critical to securing social advantage. The goods at play could be such things as 
gold, potable water, or élite higher education; but, in the case at hand, the goods are 
sex, marriage, and companionship. However, by explaining this fact about dominant 
control, the story also seeks to justify it. Thus, stigmatisation seeks ultimately to 
stablise the separation that some persons have succeeded in obtaining for themselves 
in their society.  

 It is a common misconception that a stigmatising social story stabilises such 
separation only by sowing the seeds of aversion between the separated persons. For 
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instance, Croly tells us that '[a] separate race is always hated' (1863: 53) and 
Anderson tells us that a stigmatising social story seeks to 'rationalize antipathy toward 
the group' (2010: 46). In fact, the truth is that 'a separate race' is sometimes 'hated' 
and sometimes desired. Persons who group themselves separately from other persons 
maintain that separation both by spinning stories about the fitness of those other 
persons for aversion, and—which may surprise—by spinning stories about the fitness 
of those other persons for attraction. Indeed, Anderson's own theory of stigmatisation 
shows why this is so, even if Anderson herself does not notice it.  

 Persons who group themselves separately from other persons group 
themselves either in space or by status. Separation in space excludes persons who do 
not dominate the good from access to the good; it does this by keeping them at a 
distance from the good. For example, persons who do not dominate the critical good 
might require to reside at a distance from the critical good—they might require to live 
in inner-city ghettoes. By contrast, separation by status includes persons who do not 
dominate the good in access to the good. However, this inclusion is not premised on 
the 'moral axiom' that 'every one of the living brotherhood of humankind has a moral 
claim to a place at the table provided by the collective exertions of the race' (Mill 
1849: 73). On the contrary, this inclusion is granted on the proviso that, as they 
partake of the good together, 'at the table', persons who dominate the critical good 
will enjoy a superior social role, whereas persons who do not dominate the critical 
good must assume an inferior social role. For instance, persons racialised-and-
gendered-as-black-women might be permitted to partake in sex with persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men, on the proviso that there are 'no strings 
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attached' to this sex—on the proviso, that is, that 'those family relations which form 
the dearest and strongest ties that bind humanity together' (Croly 1864: 58) are 
absent from the sex.  

 Thus, the fact that 'the colored girl may appear very beautiful in the eye of the 
white man' (Croly 1863: 37) is an instance of what William Wilberforce, the British 
campaigner against negro slavery, called 'the degradation of the Negro race, in the 
eyes of the whites' (1823: 12). Like Croly, who observed that 'the influence of slavery 
must have been, in many instances, to degrade the negro far below his own standard 
in all the better attributes of man, and thus to render him unfit for marriage with the 
better classes' (1864: 52), Wilberforce similarly observed that 'the slaves are 
considered too degraded to be proper subjects for the marriage institution'. Indeed, 
'the universal want of the marriage institution among the slaves [ . . . ] appears to 
[Wilberforce] to be one of the most influential in its immoral and degrading 
effects' (1823: 19–20). 

1.2.1.2. . . . is built out of badges . . . 

 The law that abolished slavery in the USA—the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States (1865)—was interpreted in the Civil Rights Cases of 
1883. The SCOTUS found that 'Congress has a right to enact all necessary and proper 
laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its badges and 
incidents' (1883: 21). In her article Defining the badges and incidents of slavery, 
Jennifer Mason McAward argues that '[a]n incident of slavery, as that term was used, 
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was any legal right or restriction that necessarily accompanied the institution of 
slavery' (2012: 575) and that 'after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
term "badge" of slavery was regarded in judicial circles as a post-emancipation 
synonym for "incident"' (2012: 615). Although the SCOTUS in the Civil Rights Cases 
was unconvinced that 'the denial to any person of admission to the accommodations 
and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre [ . . . ] tend[s] to fasten 
upon him any badge of slavery' (1883: 21), the SCOTUS in Loving, by contrast, held 
that '[p]enalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery' (1967: 6). Thus, the 
SCOTUS implied that those penalties now remained only as a 'badge of slavery'. Mill 
anticipated this phrase, when he called female 'sex a disqualification for privileges 
and a badge of subjection' (1869: 4.19). Strikingly, in his review of Cairnes's The 
slave power, Mill used a very similar notion to that of the disqualifying badge to 
describe the subjection of persons racialised-as-black. Mill spoke of 'the external 
brand of his past degradation' (1862b: 23). The relevant similarity between a 
disqualifying 'badge' and a degrading 'brand' is that each is affixed to the body from 
the outside, usually by someone other than the person whose body it is. This activity 
of affixing, from the outside, a disqualifying badge or brand to a body, is what Mill 
thinks social stigmatisation is. We can see that this is so, in a letter, dated 20th August 
1830, that Mill wrote from Paris to his father. Mill relates a story about 'the charcoal-
carriers (charbonniers)' who protested the rumour that they 'had used some 
expressions of encouragement' to 'Charles the Tenth a few days before the coup 
d'etat'. The charcoal-carriers protested that 'none of their number had used any such 
expressions as those described [ascribed?] to them'; Mill refers to their protest as 
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'their complaint against the sort of stigma which had been thrown upon them' (1830: 
2).  

 The relevant difference between a 'badge' and a 'brand', it is that a 'badge' is 
not part of the body to which it is affixed, whereas a 'brand' is part of the body that is 
branded. In this respect, stigma works more like a 'brand', than like a 'badge'. This is 
what Anderson means, when she says that stories to explain separation consist in 'the 
attribution of negative stereotypes to dishonorable internal traits' (2010: 46, 
italicisation mine). Anderson is referring to our cognitive bias of 'attribut[ing] 
stereotype-confirming behavior to people's internal dispositions, such as their genes, 
culture, or voluntary choices' (2010: 45). Yet, Mill's metaphor of the badge remains 
helpful, since it reminds us that the 'negative stereotypes' of which Anderson speaks 
should be understood in an unconventional way. We tend to think of 'negative 
stereotypes' as matters of bad motivation or of bad cognition, but there is a third, less 
well-discussed alternative: 'negative stereotypes' are matters of bad communication. 
In their article, A semiotic approach to understanding the role of communication in 
stereotyping, Klaus Fiedler and his colleagues tell us that: 

• 'motivational accounts attribute stereotypical biases to a desire to confirm one's 
expectancies, which may be stronger than the motive to assess the world 
accurately', 
• 'cognitive approaches posit that stereotypes (like other biases) result from resource 
limitations that prevent people from systematic or exhaustive information 
processing'.  
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By contrast,  
• '[a] semiotic approach [ . . . ] points to origins of stereotyping that are located 
outside the individual, in sign systems used for information transmission[. . . . ] The 
aim of a semiotic approach is to illuminate the crucial role of information 
transmitters used for communication between individuals, as distinct from feeling 
and thinking within individuals'. 

Fiedler and his colleagues are keen to insist that '[a] semiotic approach is in no way 
in conflict, or incompatible, with cognitive and motivational approaches, but it adds 
a radically distinct component' (Fiedler, Bluemke, Freytag, Unkelbach, & Koch 2008: 
96). This component is the sign. A sign is the association of some sensory datum—
something one can see, feel, hear, taste, or smell—with some concept—something 
one can think about. When the sign is a 'brand', the relevant concept is simply the 
fact that the branded item is owned by some particular person. However, when the 
sign is a 'badge', that sign can communicate much more than just the feature of 
being owned.  

 The act of fastening a disqualifying 'badge' to a body is the 'attribution' of the 
concept of 'disqualification' to some apparent part of that body. The disqualifying 
'badge' fastened to persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women attributes the 
concept of unfitness for cross-racial marriage, or of unfitness for cross-racial 
companionship, to some apparent part of their racialised-and-gendered bodies. We 
can observe the contemporary communicative currency of this disqualifying 'badge' 
in the way that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women are perceived, by 
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persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men, in online communities designed to 
allow daters to look for a marriageable or companionable 'match'. There are two 
aspects to this treatment: what they state in their personal advertisements and whose 
personal advertisements and unsolicited emails provoke a positive response from 
them.  

 First, in a randomised sample of 173 'White [ . . . ] men and women between 
the ages of 21 and 30 years' in 'metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia', 'June through August 
2004 and February through May 2005', Kathryn L. Sweeney and Anne A. Borden 
(2009: 746–747, 751–752) found that '[f]ewer than 3% of Whites chose Black as a 
potential dating match but 18% would date someone who is Asian and nearly half of 
the White daters [ . . . ] checked off the box indicating Latino/a as an option'. 
Moreover, in a randomised sample of 1558 'profiles from people who self-identified 
as [ . . . ] white, ['18-50', and] living within 50 miles of four major U.S. cities: New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Atlanta', on 'Yahoo Personals, the most popular 
national online dating website (Madden and Lenhart, 2006[: 11]), between 
September 2004 and May 2005', Cynthia Feliciano, Belinda Robnett, and Golmaz 
Komaie (2009: 43, 46, 48) found that '[w]hite men with stated racial preferences 
[ . . . ] only prefer not to date one group at levels above 90%: black women' and, 
'among those who state racial preferences, white males are over two and a half times 
as likely to exclude blacks as white women'.  

 Second, in a randomised sample of '597,167 observations of user actions 
(browsed profiles)' of '3,702 men', '85.33%' of whom described themselves as 
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'white', all 'located in Boston and San Diego, [ . . . ] over a three-and-a-half-month 
period in 2003', Günter J. Hitsch, Ali Hortaçsu, and Dan Ariely (2010: 397, 424, 420) 
found that, although '80.3% of men [ . . . ] state that the ethnic background of their 
partner "doesn't matter"', 'the chance of a white man [responding to a profile by] 
contacting a black woman is 10% lower than the chance of him contacting a white 
woman'. Moreover, the unique website OkCupid allows advertisers to 'build their 
own match algorithms, [. . . by] answer[ing] as many questions as they please (the 
average is about 230) [. . . and] also pick[ing] how her ideal match would answer 
and how important the question is to her' (Rudder 2009a). OkCupid found that 'in 
general, the better you match someone, the more likely you are to reply to a first 
message from them' and that 'the races all match each other roughly evenly'. 
However, although the match algorithms, authored by the 'white male' advertisers 
themselves, suggest that they should be replying to 'black female' profiles at a rate of 
42%, 'white male' advertisers reply to unsolicited emails from 'black female' profiles 
only at a rate of 32% (Rudder 2009b).  

 Mill would likely have taken a very dim view of this cutting off of the nose to 
spite the face. In his essay On liberty, Mill argues that 'the legal doctrine, that no 
person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess 
belief in a God [ . . . ] is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation'. Mill's argument 
is that, '[u]nder pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all 
atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of 
publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood'. Mill concludes 
that '[a] rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, 
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can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution' (1859: 2.18). 
Similarly, under the 'pretence' that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women 
are unfit for marriage or companionship, the online 'rule' that persons racialised-and-
gendered-as-black-women are excluded from cross-racial dating is 'suicidal, and cuts 
away its own foundation'. It is suicidal, because 'white male' advertisers lose out on 
marriage or companionship with a person who, according to their very own 
algorithms, is their marital or companionate match. This online rule 'can be kept in 
force only as a badge of hatred'—or else, as I have argued, as a badge of stigmatising 
desirability. 

1.2.1.3.  . . . and remains as the mainstream. 

 A semiotic approach to social stigmatisation is compatible with Anderson's 
theory. For Anderson (2010: 65) argues that, 'racially stigmatizing representations do 
not merely inhabit people's private thoughts; they have public standing as commonly 
known, publicly noticeable default presumptions for interracial interactions'. 
Anderson (2010: 53–54) explains these 'three dimensions of public standing' as 
follows: 
• 'A representation R is a matter of common knowledge between A and B just in case 
A and B entertain representation R, each knows that the other is entertaining r, each 
knows that each knows this, and so on'; 
• 'R is a matter of public notice just in case it is both common knowledge and 
acceptable to invoke in public discourse'; 
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• 'R has default status if it is common knowledge that R is taken for granted as a 
common premise of public discussion and interpersonal interaction, such that 
people must send countervailing signals to one another to establish a different com-
mon premise'. 

 However, observe that, although Anderson claims here to have 'distinguish[ed] 
three dimensions of public standing', she has actually distinguished only two: both 
'public noticeability' and 'default status' incorporate 'common knowledge' (be that 
'common knowledge' of the 'representation R' or be it of the fact that 'R is taken for 
granted as a common premise of public discussion and interpersonal interaction'). 
Moreover, observe that even Anderson thinks that at least some social stigmatisation 
lacks 'public noticeability': 'The stereotype of the Jewish shyster [ . . . ] is 
unmentionable in mainstream discourse. No one blinks at a news report stating that a 
twenty-three-year-old black man was arrested for murder. But a broadcast that began 
"A fifty-five-year old Jew, David Goldstein, was arrested for stock fraud today" would 
be condemned as gratuitously stirring up anti-Semitism'. We can concede to 
Anderson that the the 'public standing' of the social stigmatisation of racial blackness, 
unlike the 'public standing' of the social stigmatisation of racial Jewishness, is beset 
by 'public noticeability', without conceding to her that 'public noticeability' is 
essential to the 'public standing' of social stigmatisation. Thus, we are left with one 
essential 'dimension[...]' to this 'public standing': it's 'default status'. Mill's theory of 
the social tyranny of the mainstream can illuminate this 'default status'. Moreover, it 
can explain Anderson's charge that '[t]his public status inflicts an expressive injury on 
blacks, by assaulting their public reputation' (2010: 65, italicisation mine). 
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 Mill describes 'men' as 'those who are in a position to tyrannize' (1869: 4.9) 
and he describes 'the ex-slave-owners' as 'those who have had tyrannical power 
taken away from them' (1850: 3); Mill refers to '[t]he subjection of women' as the  
'tyranny with which the man is legally invested' (1869: 2.2), and, in his 
Autobiography, he refers to 'negro slavery' as 'the worst and most anti-social form of 
the tyranny of men over men' (1873b: 7.31). Indeed, in his review of Cairnes's The 
slave power, Mill denies that 'negro slavery' is 'the name of one social evil among 
many others'. On the contrary, 'in truth it is[...] the summing-up and concentration of 
them all; the stronghold in which the principle of tyrannical power, elsewhere only 
militant, reigns triumphant' (1862: 41). What, then, for Mill, is 'social tyranny'? 

 Among 'pain in general', Mill distinguishes 'the infliction of pain by the mere 
will of a human being'. Mill refers to this subset of 'all pain' as 'despotism' and as 
'tyranny' (1850: 14). Thus, for Mill, 'social tyranny' is the antithesis of 'Social 
Liberty'.'Social Liberty' consists in 'the [ . . . ] limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over the individual' (1859: 1.1); it includes both 
'limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the 
community' (1859: 1.2) and 'a limit to the legitimate interference of collective 
opinion with individual independence' (1859: 1.5). Thus, 'social tyranny' exists, 
when appropriate limits are not placed on either (a) 'the power [of] the ruler [ . . . ] 
operating through the acts of the public authorities' or (b) 'the [ . . . ] interference of 
collective opinion', which 'execute[s] its own mandates' (1859: 1.5). 
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 However, as Timothy Hinton points out, in his article Liberalism, feminism, and 
social tyranny, '[i]t is a striking fact that contemporary philosophical liberalism has 
almost entirely ignored the topic of social tyranny as Mill describes it'. According to 
Hinton, John Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin (2000)—the theorists who dominate 
'contemporary philosophical liberalism'—assume that 'the proper focus of liberal 
political philosophy is on the system of legal rights people possess'. As a 
consequence, 'one of the cardinal assumptions of the kind of liberalism espoused by 
Rawls and Dworkin [is] that what Mill refers to as "social mandates" fall entirely 
outside the proper province of political philosophy' (2007: 238). Hinton argues that 
'[e]ither contemporary liberals must return to the more radical doctrine affirmed by 
Mill or else they must deny that [ . . . ] inequalities are rooted in social, as opposed to 
legal structures'. Let us eschew the legalistic chauvinism of Rawls and Dworkin, and 
let us return to the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Corresponding to the two 
threats to 'Social Liberty' that he identifies, Mill distinguishes two types of 'social 
tyranny', two ways in which 'the people [ . . . ] may [ . . . ] oppress a part of their 
number' (1859: 1.4). 

Table 2. Social tyranny 
social tyranny
tyranny of the magistrate
tyranny of the monarch
tyranny of the majority
tyranny of the mighty
tyranny of the mainstream
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 On the one hand, there is 'the tyranny of the magistrate' (1859: 1.5), which is 
'the tyranny of the political rulers'. Since the 'political rulers [ . . . ] consisted of a 
governing One, or a governing tribe or caste' (1859: 1.2), tyranny exercised by 'a 
governing One' may be called the tyranny of the monarch and tyranny exercised by 
'a governing tribe or caste' is what Mill calls 'the tyranny of the majority' (1859: 1.4). 
However, Mill himself reminds us that tyranny exercised by 'a governing tribe or 
caste' can consist in tyranny by either 'the most numerous or the most active part of 
the people'. Thus, to take account of 'those who succeed in making themselves 
accepted as the majority', Mill would have done better to distinguish 'the tyranny of 
the majority' from the tyranny of the mighty. A tribe or caste is socially mighty, if it 
succeeds in exercising 'the tyranny of the magistrate', despite its numerical minority.  

 On the other hand, there is what Mill would have called—I think—the tyranny 
of the mainstream. For, in his essay On liberty, Mill refers to 'the tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion and feeling' (1859: 1.5) and, in his parliamentary speech decrying 
Chichester Fortescue's Land Bill, Mill (1866b) argues that 'Ireland is in the main 
stream of human existence and human feeling and opinion; it is England that is in 
one of the lateral channels'. Thus, just as, literally, the mainstream is not 'the lateral', 
but the leading current in a river, metaphorically, Mill conceives of the mainstream as 
the leading current in society. We see this metaphorical use of 'the main stream', 
elsewhere in Mill's oeuvre. For instance, in his review of Auguste Comte's Cours de 
philosophie positive, Mill says that 'M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of 
human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van' (1865a: 69, 
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italicisation mine). Similarly, in a review of Albany Fonblanque's England under 
seven administrations, Mill discusses 'a person who has a multitude of ideas' and 
picks out 'his leading idea', which Mill describes as the 'more obvious reason', as 
'the main stream of the thought' (1837: 3, italicisation mine). 

 A theory of the tyranny of the mainstream is not forthcoming from either Rawls 
and Dworkin, who focus exclusively on 'the tyranny of the magistrate'. By contrast, 
Mill theorises the tyranny of the mainstream as  

'the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its 
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; 
to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any 
individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to 
fashion themselves upon the model of its own' (1859: 1.5).  

Hitherto, this description has been understood to pick out social 'rules of conduct' for 
the 'fashion[ing]' of 'characters'. For instance, Anderson (1991: 24–25) takes what I 
have called the mainstream to be the leading way of making character-forming 
decisions about the 'conduct' of one's life, like decisions about 'adopting [a] new 
conception of the good'. Anderson argues that, '[t]o discover a superior conception 
of the good, we must be free to explore different ways of life under conditions of 
toleration': precisely what a tyranny of the mainstream has been thought to stop us 
from doing.  

 However, this is not the only way in which 'society [can] impose, by other 
means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules'. For just as 'collective 
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opinion' may 'interfere[...]' with individual 'character', it may also 'interfere[...]' with 
interpersonal communication. This 'interference' occurs when society [ . . . ] 
impose[s . . . ] its own ideas and practices' not 'as rules of conduct', but as rules of 
communication. On this alternative view, the mainstream is the leading way of 
communicating about the natural and social world in which one is situated. This is 
what it means for it to be 'common knowledge that [a representation of some item in 
that world] is taken for granted as a common premise of public discussion and 
interpersonal interaction'. Moreover, it is the fact that this way of communicating is 
the mainstream that makes any onlooker's interpretation of an act or an event 
reasonable. From the point of view of an onlooker to some action or event that 
occurs in a community, that action or event is correctly said to have generated a 
stigma, if (a) there exists, in that community, a tyrannous mainstream way of 
communicating about human bodies, and (b) the action or event, to paraphrase 
Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes (2000: 1525), 'make[s] sense in light of 
the community's [mainstream] practices' of communicating about human bodies. 

1.2.2. Enslaving the soul itself 

1.2.2.1. He dares not call his soul his own 

 Mill argues that the tyranny of the mainstream is  

'a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, 
since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer 
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means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and 
enslaving the soul itself' (1859: 1.5).  

According to Ferdinand David Schoeman, in his book Privacy and social freedom, to 
say that a tyranny 'enslaves the soul' is to say that it 'distorts the process of 
development that makes a self rationally competent' (1992: 25). 'A self that is socially 
engineered', Schoeman tells us, 'cannot engage in rational assessment'. Similarly, 
according to Hinton, 'dominating people's very souls' consists in 'shaping their 
identities in ways that are unacceptable' (2007: 237) and in 'distort[ing] our deepest 
sense of who we are' (2007: 248).  

 However, neither Schoeman nor Hinton capture what Mill meant by the 
phrase 'enslaving the soul itself'. Indeed, for Mill, 'enslaving the soul itself' is less 
about engineering who one is, so much as about monopolising how one is 
represented. That this is so, is clear from the notes he made, on 8th May 1834, in the 
Monthly Repository. Mill decries  

'the provincial attornies, [ . . . ] who derive all their consequence from the 
management, which they now hold in their hands, of the pecuniary affairs of 
the whole landed aristocracy'.  

For, according to Mill,  

'[t]he attorney, who under good laws and a good system of judicature would 
be nobody, is now the most influential personage in every small place: and 
the landowner, [ . . . ] whose affairs [ . . . ] he alone is competent to manage, 
is held by him in a state of the most slavish dependence'.  

50
This 'most slavish dependence' consists in the fact that  

'the soul [ . . . ] of an English landowner, intellect, conscience, and all, is 
folded up in his title deeds, and kept in a box at his attorney's office. He 
dares not call his soul his own, for he dares not call his estate his own, 
without the leave of his attorney'.  

The role of the attorney is to represent a client in public discourse on legal matters. If 
the 'laws' and the 'system of judicature' are bad, this role, Mill thinks, grants the 
attorney an undeserved monopolistic power over how the client will be represented 
in public discourse. This leaves the client slavishly dependent upon the attorney, at 
whose whim the client might be favourably or disreputably represented. This situation 
brings about a distinct sort of pain for the client. Thus, to charge the tyranny of the 
mainstream with 'enslaving the soul itself' is to charge it not merely with 'assaulting', 
but with enslaving a person's 'public reputation'. 

1.2.2.2. Few of us can afford to show our bodies 

'Berlin.  
I found it dazzling. The city had a jewel-like sparkle, especially at night, that 
didn't exist in Paris. The vast cafés reminded me of ocean liners powered by 
the rhythms of their orchestras. There was music everywhere. Word of our 
success at the Champs-Élysées had preceded us and we were greeted with 
great excitement. There were rumors that the show was indecent, an 
impression I may have strengthened when a reporter asked me to describe 
my ideal world. One where we can all go naked, as in paradise, I replied. I 
was quick to add that few of us can afford to show our bodies'. 

 Those were the words of Josephine Baker (1977: 58), in the autobiography she 
wrote with her husband, Jo Bouillon. Baker was a North American person racialised-
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and-gendered-as-a-black-woman. Bouillon was a French person racialised-and-
gendered-as-a-white-man. Baker's use of the words 'us' and 'our' are ambiguous, but 
they certainly allow for the possibility that Baker is speaking on behalf of persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women. Let us take Baker to be doing just that. Let 
us interpret Baker's words to mean that, in our non-ideal social and political world, 
persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women cannot afford to show their bodies. 
I shall defend Baker's assertion, by arguing that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-women cannot afford to show their bodies, in just the same way that 'an 
English landowner[... . . . ] dares not call his soul his own'. 

 The word 'afford' here is key. If I can afford to do something, I can do that 
thing without running the risk of adverse consequences. Baker's use of the word 
'afford' recalls to mind the more recent use to which that word was put, in An open 
letter from black women to the SlutWalk, posted at Black Women's Blueprint, on 
23rd September 2011. The SlutWalk was a local and, thereafter, global, reaction to 
the following words, uttered on 24th January 2011, by a representative of the Toronto 
Police Service: 'women should avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be victimized'. 
On its website, the organisation SlutWalk Toronto (2011) says that the word  

'"Slut" is being re-appropriated. [ . . . ] We are asking you to join us for 
SlutWalk, to make a unified statement about sexual assault and victims' 
rights and to demand respect for all. Whether a fellow slut or simply an ally, 
you don't have to wear your sexual proclivities on your sleeve, we just ask 
that you come'.  
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This invitation is, in the open letter, declined. The many, and often distinguished, 
signatories of the open letter, who name themselves as 'the undersigned women of 
African descent and anti-violence advocates, activists, scholars, organizational and 
spiritual leaders', say that '[w]e know the SlutWalk is a call to action and we have 
heard you'. However, they give the following reason for declining this invitation: 
'Even if only in name, we cannot afford to label ourselves, to claim identity, to chant 
dehumanizing rhetoric against ourselves in any movement' (Tanis et al. 2011). 

 Notice three things about this assertion that distinguish it from Baker's 
assertion. First, it is more explicit. Second, it is much stronger. Third, it is not merely 
an assertion; it is the conclusion of an argument. First, whereas Baker refers to an 
some ill-defined subset of an unspecified group of persons—'few of us', the 
signatories refer to themselves and to every person who is a member of their 
solidarity—'we'. Second, whereas, according to Baker, 'few of us can afford to show 
our bodies', if our bodies are 'naked', the signatories, by contrast, 'cannot afford' to 
show their bodies, '[e]ven if only in name'. Indeed, the signatories say that 'we don't 
have the privilege to walk through the streets of New York City, Detroit, D.C., Atlanta, 
Chicago, Miami, L.A. etc., either half-naked or fully clothed self-identifying as "sluts" 
and think that this will make women safer in our communities an hour later, a month 
later, or a year later'. In other words, the signatories cannot afford to show off their 
bodies, i.e. to represent their bodies, publicly and ostentatiously, in a sexually eye-
catching way. Third, the word 'dehumanizing' is key to understanding the argument 
of the signatories, for they say that 'we can[not] self-identify as "sluts" when we're still 
working to annihilate the word "ho", which deriving from the word "hooker" or 
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"whore", as in "Jezebel whore" was meant to dehumanize'. Thus, it is the threat of 
dehumanisation—the threat, that is, of having one's status as a human being stripped 
away—that leads the signatories to conclude that they cannot afford to participate in 
the way they have been invited to participate. Dehumanisation is the adverse 
consequence that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women risk, if they show 
off their bodies. As Sydney Fonteyn Lewis puts it, in her doctoral dissertation, Looking 
forward to the past: Black women's sexual agency in 'neo' cultural productions, 

'[w]hereas the word "slut" has historically been used to shame white women 
into normative categories of sexual behaviors, black women have historically 
never had access to these normative categories [ . . . ] Although black 
women have doubtlessly been called sluts, the word has functioned 
differently, not as an aberrant to the chaste norm, but as a generalized 
description of black womanhood' (2012: 15–16).  

 We can demonstrate that 'slut' has 'functioned' as a 'generalized description 
of black womanhood', by adding a third dimension to our analysis of the way in 
which persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women are perceived, by persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men, in communities designed to allow daters to 
look for a marriageable or companionable 'match'. So far, we have analysed  

1. what they state in their personal advertisements, and  
2. whose personal advertisements and unsolicited correspondence provoke a 
positive response from them,  

Yet, we can also analyse 
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3. what expectations they express, in their positive responses. 

It might be thought that the private conversations about sex, marriage, and 
companionship that occur between individual persons are unobservable. Not so. In 
an unexampled experiment, the social psychologist Yann Le Bihan placed three 
bogus personal advertisements in two French magazines. Varying only in respect of 
one word, each advertisement read as follows: 'Very beautiful young [black, mixed-
race, blond] woman, 26 years old, would like to meet a man to share fun times and 
more if we're a match. Only detailed letters will receive a reply'. Six advertisements, 
placed between 1997 and 1999, in the Mariage section of Le Chasseur Français, 
yielded 637 responses. Three similar advertisements (omitting the words 'and more if 
we're a match'), placed in 1997, in the more ambiguously entitled Particuliers 
Femmes section of Le Nouvel Observateur, yielded 235 responses. In total, Le Bihan 
received 872 mailed letters from persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men. 

 Le Bihan used software to calculate how frequently certain words, grouped into 
themes, recurred among the letters. Le Bihan found the following: (a) 'the blond 
woman' received the greatest number of replies; (b) 'the woman of mixed race' 
received few overtly sexual letters and a significant number of letters from wealthy, 
middle-aged professionals, who saw in her a potential trophy wife (2007: 200); and 
(c) 'the black woman' was seen as 'the woman of third choice' (2007: 171). Not only 
did she receive the fewest replies (237, or 27.2% of the total), she received replies of 
inferior quality, from persons who tended to present socio-economic impairments 
that might inhibit them from participating in sex, marriage, or companionship with 
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either 'the blond woman' or 'the woman of mixed race'. These persons tended to be 
older, on-the-rebound, unemployed, income-poor, and uncultivated. Indeed, they 
tended to be rural and to request that 'the black woman' participate in agricultural 
work. Most significantly, their replies to 'the black woman' tended to be sexual, as 
opposed to marital. Only she received naked photographs. Words suggesting a 
demand for sex were more frequently found in replies to her. Only she received 
sexually explicit replies to an advertisement under the rubric of Mariage (2007: 191, 
171–192, 235–236). This, then, is why persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women cannot afford to show their bodies: the mainstream way of communicating 
about their human bodies disqualifies them as sexual sluts who are unfit for marriage 
or companionship. 

 This shows us why 'discrimination' fails to capture, and why 'stigmatisation' 
better captures, 'the chief mischief of the legal penalities' against miscegenation. 
First, a discriminatory action is an action that denies someone a benefit. For example, 
it denies someone the rights of legal marriage or it denies someone one's hand in 
marriage. Yet, if the mainstream way of communicating about the human bodies of 
persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women associates them with fitness for 
purely pleasurable sex, it seems that these persons are getting a benefit, not being 
denied one. Discrimination cannot explain why it is harmful that these persons get 
sex, that others do not. By contrast, stigmatisation can account for the harm of this 
benefit, because stigmatisation attends to the story that is spun to stabilise that 
benefaction. Second, although an assault on one's public reputation, and the threat 
of living up to one's damaged public reputation, are both harms, neither needs to be 
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mediated by any discriminatory action. On the one hand, although discriminatory 
actions that 'make sense in light of' the mainstream way of communicating about 
human bodies are reasonably interpreted, by any onlooker, as expressing disrepute, 
that mainstream way of communicating can exist without any actions that deny a 
benefit to some. On the other hand, no one need deny a person any benefit, for her 
to experience the threat of 'slut', when she walks in the street. Thus, 'the chief 
mischief of the legal penalties' against miscegenation was not 'discrimination', but 











Encounters that count: 'a foundation for solid friendship' 

 '[W]e can', Mill tells us, 'if we are sufficiently determined upon it, abolish all 
tyranny'. Mill thinks that 'the abolition [ . . . ] of despotism' or 'tyranny' is equivalent 
to 'freedom' and that 'one of the greatest victories yet gained over [tyranny] is slave-
emancipation' (1850: 14). However, I have argued that, even though the law of 
enslavement no longer penalises cross-racial marriage involving them, persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women remain enslaved with respect to their 
public reputation. Repeal was not enough, because repeal was not destigmatisation. 
How, then, can we abolish the tyranny of the mainstream way of communicating 
about—how can we, that is, destigmatise—the human bodies of persons racialised-
and-gendered-as-black-women? 

 I shall argue that this tyranny is, in the words of the Indian constitutionalist, Dr 
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, 'essentially a problem of Caste'. Ambedkar shares Mill's 
optimism that we can abolish Caste. In an address, which he wrote for, but was not 
ultimately permitted to deliver to, Lahore's Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal, or Society for the 
Destruction of Caste—an address, which he later published as The annihilation of 
Caste, and an address that Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi said '[n]o reformer can 
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ignore' (1936)—Ambedkar argues that '[t]he real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-
marriage'. However, I shall reject Ambedkar's assertion as it stands and argue that his 
own premises lead us to a revised version of this assertion: 'the real remedy for 
breaking Caste' is com-panion-ship. Com-panion-ship is companionship that is built, 
over time, though the activity of regular and frequent meal-sharing. Indeed, even 
Ambedkar himself argues that '[a]nother plan of action for the abolition of Caste is to 
begin with inter-caste dinners'. I shall defend this latter assertion. I shall argue that 
com-panion-ship can destigmatise the bodies of persons racialised-and-gendered-as-












2.1.0. The real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-marriage 

2.1.1. Essentially a problem of Caste 

 Harriet Taylor Mill, in her essay The enfranchisement of women, which she 
published in the same year that she married John Stuart Mill, remarks that 'we are 
firmly convinced that the division of mankind into two castes, one born to rule over 
the other, is in this case, as in all cases, an unqualified mischief' (1851: 17). This 
'unqualified mischief' was similarly condemned by Mill, himself, who, in a letter, 
dated 15th May 1865, to Parke Godwin, identifies 'one thing [he] hope[s] will be 
considered absolutely necessary: to break altogether the power of the slaveholding 
caste'. Given that his father authored the first and, for some time after, standard 
History of British India (Mill 1818), and given that both he and his father were 
employed, for the majority of their working lives, by the East India Company (Mazlish 
1988), it is highly probable that the Mills are likening the '[s]ubjection of women' 
and 'the matter of negro slavery' to caste in India. Under the title Castes in India: 
Their mechanism, genesis and development, Ambedkar presented, in a seminar on 
anthropology, at Columbia University, his 'critical evaluation of the various 
characteristics of Caste'. Although he was not a contemporary of Mill, it is not 
unreasonable that we take him seriously as a philosopher of caste, given that he was 
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probably the first person categorised-as-untouchable to pursue philosophy at a 
doctoral level and given that, in his The annihilation of Caste, he acknowledges the 
philosopher 'Prof. John Dewey, who was my teacher and to whom I owe so 
much' (1936b: 25.4).  

 Ambedkar's 'critical evaluation [ . . . ] leave[s] no doubt that prohibition, or 
rather the absence of intermarriage—endogamy, to be concise—is the only one that 
can be called the essence of Caste when rightly understood' (1917: 11). On 
Ambedkar's analysis, the endogamous essence of  

'the Caste system has two aspects. In one of its aspects, it divides men into 
separate communities. In its second aspect, it places these communities in a 
graded order one above the other in social status' (1936b: 21).  

Yet, as Traude Pillai-Vetschera argues, in her chapter, Ambedkar's daughters: A Study 
of Mahar women in Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra, endogamy does not 
separate and grade 'men', so much as 'women'. According to Pillai-Vetschera,  

'[c]aste ranking within the system depended to a large extent on the sexual 
purity of the women. Each community tried to control female sexuality 
through rules and regulations, very strict ones among the high castes, less 
severe ones—permitting more freedom to women—among the lower 
orders' (2007: 242).  

However, the word 'freedom', here, is a euphemism, because endogamy grants 
sexual freedom only at a cost that persons categorised-and-gendered-as-untouchable-
women can ill afford. It is not something they have cause to celebrate. As Meena 
Kandasamy (2011) put it, in her article Celebrating the loud slutty sensibility,  
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'in our country, when a man chooses to abuse a woman by calling her a 
whore or slut in any of the regional languages, he attaches a caste-epithet to 
the slur. Needless to say, such an epithet almost always carries a reference to 
one untouchable caste or another'.  

Thus, to paraphrase Lewis, 'slut' has 'functioned' as a 'generalized description of 
black' and untouchable 'womanhood'. In each injustice, endogamous separation is 
sustained by mainstreaming a rule of communication, according to which persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women, or persons categorised-and-gendered-as-
untouchable-women, are unfit for cross-racial or cross-caste marriage or 
companionship. 

 However, Ambedkar also deploys his philosophical concept of 'Caste' (with a 
capital 'C') beyond Brahminical and White Domination. He argues that 'there was a 
social problem between Ulster and Southern Ireland: the problem between Catholics 
and Protestants, which is essentially a problem of Caste' (1936b: 2.19). Similarly, Mill 
argued that 'the opponents of Catholic emancipation [ . . . ] are willing to degrade 
five or six millions of their countrymen to the condition of an inferior caste' (1825b: 
12). This assertion should not be written off as the exaggeration to which a nineteen-
year-old ingénue might be prone. For, in his Autobiography, Mill remarked that 
'[t]hese writings [ . . . ] were original thinking, as far as that name can be applied to 
old ideas in new forms and connexions' (1873b: 4.18). Yet, we should not be 
distracted by the fact that both Ambedkar and Mill frame the 'social problem between 
Ulster and Southern Ireland' in religious terms. Christian religious difference became 
a social problem in Ireland only in the early sixteenth century, when the Church of 
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England, in 1534, rejected the authority of the Roman Catholic Pope. Nearly two 
hundred years prior to this religious schism, the English Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
had enacted the Statutes of Kilkenny (1367), which 'ordained and established that no 
alliance by marriage, gossipred, fostering of children, concubinage or amour or in 
any other manner be henceforth made between the English and Irish on the one side 
or on the other. [ . . . ] And if any do to the contrary and thereof be attaint, that he 
shall have judgment of life and limb as a traitor to our lord the King' (Curtis & 
McDowell 1943: 53). The aim of this 'legal penalty' was to maintain, as a separate 
population, the Anglo-Irish descendants of the Cambro-Normans, who had invaded 
Ireland, in the second half of the twelfth century (Mitchell 2007). 

 Mill proposes a remedy for this social problem. In his Considerations on 
representative government, Mill argues that, in Ireland, 'the memory of the past, and 
the difference in the predominant religion[ . . . ] keep apart two races, perhaps the 
most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing counterpart of one 
another' (1861a: 16.9). Indeed, in the Morning Chronicle, in his series of forty-three 
leading articles, evaluating the many different 'opinions on the nature of the remedy 
which the condition of Ireland requires' (5th October 1846: 4), Mill argues that it is 
'desirable' that 'the Irish branch of the human family [ . . . ] should enter into the 
admixture'. Mill specified that this 'ent[rance]' was 'desirable [ . . . ] perhaps largely, 
especially when the other element is composed of the Saxon race, which needs to be 
tempered by amalgamation with the more excitable and imaginative constitution and 
the more generous impulses of its Celtic kinsfolk' (26th October 1846: 6). Doubtless 
Mill would have agreed with Croly that '[i]n England the Irish are a separate class, 
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degraded as the negro is in the Northern States' (1864: 59). Thus, Mill spins a similar 
stigmatising story about persons racialised-as-Irish to that which Croly spins about 
persons racialised-as-negro. Moreover, although he only advocates it as a remedy 
when 'laying the foundation of new nations beyond the sea', Mill nonetheless 
advocates, for persons racialised-as-Irish and persons racialised-as-English, a similar 
remedy to that which Croly advocates for persons racialised-as-negro and persons 
racialised-as-white.  

 Yet, there is one dissimilarity. Mill uses a different word: 'amalgamation'. 
Under the title of 'Reasons for coining these words', Croly argues that 
'[a]malgamation is a poor word, since it properly refers to the union of metals with 
quicksilver, and was, in fact, only borrowed for an emergency, and should now be 
returned to its proper signification' (1864: ii). In clearing the way for his neologism, 
Croly resists the continued use of the word 'amalgamation', but not the continued 
use of the metaphor. Indeed, towards the end of his essay, Croly continues to use the 
metaphor, this time to describe the changing character of the North American 
political landscape:  

'Four years ago the Democrats, so-called, defended slavery, and the 
Republicans only dared to assert an opposition to the extension of slavery. 
The Republican party to-day boldly demands that every black man in the 
land shall be free; [ . . . ] the great Republican party has merged into the little 
abolition party. The drop has colored the bucket-full' (1863: 48–50).  

Thus, the metaphor of amalgamation begins with the idea of a freshly-purchased and 
recently-opened 'bucket[...]full' of white paint. Then, the idea is that paint in this 
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'bucket' is 'colored', by adding a 'drop' of paint that is not white in colour. It is best, 
according to this theory, that the white paint be kept pure; failing that, in any 
admixture, the white paint is to be predominant. However, so powerful is the paint 
that is not white in colour, that just one 'drop' can contaminate a whole 'bucket-full'. 
The theory that this metaphor generates explains the proviso Mill gives to his 
miscegenistic remedy: 'a people who, in so great a degree, yet remain to be civilized' 
should not 'be the predominant ingredient' (1846: 6). 

 However, this theory is incompatible with the theory of social stigmatisation 
that is, elsewhere, generated, by Mill's metaphor of the 'badge'. One way to grasp the 
incompatibility, is to see each theory as a competing etymology of the word 'caste'. 
This English word is derived from the Portuguese noun phrase casta raça, which is 
ambiguous: it may have meant 'pure breed' (cf. Latin castus = English 'chaste') or it 
may have meant 'separated lineage' (cf. Latin castus, from carere = English 
'separated', from 'to cut off'). The former meaning correlates with procreativity sexual 
biological miscegenation, whereas the latter meaning correlates with horizontally 
relational miscegenation. In his first aspect of Caste, Ambedkar conceives of this 
separation as consisting in an imagined boundary between those persons who are cut 
off from each other. Although Ambedkar tells us that 'Caste is not [ . . . ] a physical 
barrier', 'not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire', he 
nevertheless remains committed to the assertion that Caste is a 'object', 'barrier', 
'wall', or 'line'—just a 'notional' one. Importantly, what this means is that flout the 
authority of this 'line' is to cross the social boundary established by Caste. This theory 
of crossing 'Caste' competes with the alternative theory of contaminating purity, 
65
which assumes that Brahminity, whiteness, or Protestant Englishness exists, prior to 
the erection of the 'notional' boundary. Furthermore, in his second aspect of Caste, 
Ambedkar conceives of the 'graded order' of the separated persons as 'the slight and 
stigma cast upon them by the Hindu religion' (1936b: 4.5). In this use of the phrase 
'cast upon', Ambedkar puns. For, etymologically, the English verb to cast is derived 
from an Old Norse verb kasta, meaning 'to throw'. This etymology shows us that 
Ambedkar theorises Caste in the same way that Mill theorised stigma—as something 
'thrown upon' a person, to explain social separation. Indeed, as Gary Michael 
Tartakov (2009: 104) has demonstrated, 'the sociological concept of stigmatized 
classes explains the situations of Dalits and African Americans better than the unique 
traditional accounts of their situations, as matters of caste pollution or racial 
inferiority'. Thus, we ought not to be distracted by the metaphor of amalgamation: for 
both Mill and Ambedkar, to stigmatise is to cast aspersions. 

2.1.2. The feeling of being kith and kin 

 Mill argues that 'the tie which connects a man with his wife' 'in many men 
exclude[s], and in most, greatly temper[s], the impulses and propensities which lead 
to tyranny' (1869: 2.2). Similarly, Ambedkar's initial statement of his prescription is 
that '[t]he real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-marriage. Nothing else will serve as 
the solvent of Caste' (1936b: 20). Indeed, the Supreme Court of India has recently 
endorsed Ambedkar's 'real remedy': In the matter of Lata Singh vs. State of Uttar 
Pradesh & Another (2006), Justice Markandey Katju asserted that 'inter-caste 
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marriages are in fact in the national interest as they will result in destroying the caste 
system'. 

 We may reconstruct Ambedkar's argument for this assertion as follows: 

1. 'Fusion of blood can alone create the feeling of being kith and 
kin' (1936b: 20). 
2. '[U]nless this feeling of kinship, of being kindred, becomes paramount the 
separatist feeling—the feeling of being aliens—created by Caste will not 
vanish' (1936b: 20). 
3. 'You must make your efforts to uproot Caste' (1936b: 26.2) and 'the 
separatist feeling—the feeling of being aliens—created by [it]'. 
Therefore, 
4. You must fuse your blood. 

 I accept Ambedkar's third and second premises, but I reject his first premise. 
Let me address these in reverse order. Ambedkar's third premise is supported by the 
conjunction of Mill's utilitarianism and Mill's argument that social stigmatisation is a 
social tyranny; I shall not advance an additional argument for it, here. Ambedkar's 
second premise contrasts two distinct 'feeling[s]'. On the one hand, there is 'the 
separatist feeling [ . . . ] created by Caste'. This is not just the feeling of being 
separate. Since 'the Caste system has two aspects', it is also the feeling of being 'in a 
graded order one above the other in social status' (1936b: 21). Thus, 'the feeling of 
being aliens' better captures this feeling of being both separated and graded at the 
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same time. On the other hand, there is 'this feeling of kinship, of being kindred'. 
Distinguish the 'feeling of kinship, of being kindred', which I shall call commonality, 
from the fact 'of kinship, of being kindred', a fact to which Ambedkar refers, in his 
first premise, as '[f]usion of blood'. Ambedkar's second premise is compelling, 
because it is a matter of kindred feeling and not a matter of kindred fact. Conversely, 
Ambedkar's first premise is not compelling, because it is a matter of kindred fact and 
not a matter of kindred feeling. Thus, in section 2.1.2.1., I shall show that 
Ambedkar's second premise is true, because over fifty years' worth of independent 
lines of social psychological enquiry has confirmed the hypothesis that cross-caste 
commonality is necessary to break what Gordon Allport called 'prejudice'. In section 
2.1.2.2., I shall show that Ambedkar's first premise is false, because it expresses the 
proposition that only cross-caste kinship can give rise to cross-caste commonality. I 
argue that cross-caste kinship is an unreliable source of cross-caste commonality, and 
(in 2.2.1.) that cross-caste commonality can also be created by what I call cross-caste 
companionship. 

2.1.2.1. Cross-caste commonality 

 Allport, who, in his book on The nature of prejudice, established the relevant 
social psychological theory, stipulated both a premise about cross-caste 
commonality and a premise about cross-caste 'contact'. Unfortunately, Allport's 
theory is now standardly and unshakeably referred to as 'the contact hypothesis'. This 
is a terrible misrepresentation of the hypothesis and of the social scientific evidence 
that has conformed to and confirmed it. For, Allport's contention is not at all that, for 
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instance, persons should be in 'contact' with each other, i.e. that they should 'touch' 
each other or 'touch base' with each other (cf. Latin con + tactus = 'a touching'). 
Indeed, Allport's hypothesis was not correctly summarised by Diana Ross (1970): 
'Reach out and touch somebody's hand; make this world a better place, if you can'. 
On the contrary, Allport's contention is that persons should encounter or confront 
each other; they should interact, or engage in some activity with, each other. Thus, 
the social psychological theory were more accurately called the hypothesis of 
interactive encounter.  

 However, not all encounters count—this was why Allport (1954: 281) placed 
no fewer than four conditions on the success of any such encounter. In defining 
success, Allport focused on the reduction of what he called 'prejudice'. Allport 
defined 'prejudice' as 'an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization'. 
Notice how Allport's limited understanding of the nature of stigma leads him (a) to 
overlook the fact that stigma occasions attraction, as well as 'antipathy', and (b) the 
fact that stigma is not only a motivational matter of 'antipathy' and a cognitive matter 
of 'faulty and inflexible generalization', but also something semiotic. Thus, Allport's 
'prejudice' is not the whole of Mill's 'stigma'. However, it is a significant aspect of it, 
and so what Allport has to say about 'prejudice' is relevant to what Ambedkar argues 
about Caste. 'Prejudice', Allport told us, 'may be reduced by': 

1. 'equal status contact between majority and minority groups' 
2. 'in the pursuit of common goals'. 
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Allport added that 'The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is'  

3. 'sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., law, custom or local 
atmosphere)',  

'and provided it is' 

4. 'of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common 
humanity between members of the two groups'. 

 The notion of cross-caste 'common[ality]' seems to appear in both Allport's 
second and fourth conditions. In the second condition, there is commonality of the 
'goals' pursued, whereas, in the fourth condition, there is commonality of the 
'interests' and 'humanity' of the pursuers of those goals. A goal is something not yet 
realised and something that could only be realised in the future. By contrast, an 
interest or one's humanity is real and present. What Ambedkar called 'this feeling of 
kinship, of being kindred' is better captured by a commonality of something real and 
present, than by a commonality of something yet to be realised. Thus, Allport's fourth 
condition is what is key to the defence of Ambedkar's second premise. 

 However, whereas Allport merely hypothesises that cross-caste 
'common[ality]' 'greatly enhance[s]' the 'reduc[tion]' of 'prejudice', Ambedkar 
asserts that cross-caste commonality must be 'paramount' in order to 'break[...] 
Caste'. We can understand the dispute between Allport and Ambedkar as a dispute 
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over what sort of encounters constitute sufficient 'integration'. According to 
Anderson, '[i]ntegration consists in the participation as equals of all groups in all 
social domains' and 'the typical temporal order in which a society moves from 
segregation to full integration' is 'in four stages:  

(1) formal desegregation,  
(2) spatial integration,  
(3) formal social integration, and  
(4) informal social integration'.  

The first stage 'consists in the abolition of laws and policies enforcing racial 
separation'; the second stage 'consists in the common use on terms of equality of 
facilities and public spaces by substantial numbers of all races'. The third stage 
'occurs when members of different races cooperate in accordance with 
institutionally defined social roles, and all races occupy all roles in enough 
numbers that roles are not racially identified'. The fourth and final stage 'happens 
when members of different races form friendships, date, marry, bear children or 
adopt different race children. At school and work, it happens when members of 
different races share conversations at the lunch table, hobnob over the coffee 
break, and play together at recess' (2010: 116). Allport as saying that a society's 
achievement of Anderson's fourth and final stage would be a 'great[...] 
enhancement', but that its achievement of her third stage would be sufficient to 
reduce 'prejudice'—understood motivationally and cognitively. By contrast, 
Ambedkar is saying that a society's achievement of Anderson's third stage would be 
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insufficient to dismantle 'stigma'—understood semiotically. For that, the fourth and 
final stage is necessary. 

 Sixty years of social psychological experiments have progressively shown 
that Ambedkar was very probably right. Not only have Allport's successors found 
that the fourth condition should have been expressed much more strongly; they 
have found that it is the fourth condition that makes any cross-caste encounter 
count. For instance, in his article, The systematic analysis of socially significant 
events: A strategy for social research, Stuart W. Cook (1962: 75), found that he had 
to 'take account of one of the most frequently reported findings with regard to 
intergroup contact—namely, the more intimate or neighborly the association, the 
more favorable the attitude'. To this end, Cook interpreted Allport's fourth condition 
as expressing the necessity of 'acquaintance potential', by which Cook meant that 
cross-caste 'contact' should offer an 'opportunity [ . . . ] for the participants to get 
to know and understand one another'. Later, Thomas Pettigrew (1997: 173, 183), in 
an article, Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice, rendered the 
condition even more demanding. In a study of the 'self-reports of 3,806 survey 
respondents in seven 1988 national probability samples of France, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, and West Germany', Pettigrew found that 'a situation's potential 
for friendship is an essential, not just facilitating, condition of optimal intergroup 
contact'. More recently, in an article, Racial reconciliation in South Africa: Interracial 
contact and changes over time, James L. Gibson and Christopher Claassen gave the 
condition even more stringency. 'In 2004', Gibson and Claassen report, '4,108 
interviews were completed, including 1,549 Blacks, 1,362 Whites, 738 Coloured 
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respondents, and 459 South Africans of Indian origin'. From these interviews, Gibson 
and Claassen (2010: 271) found that 'contact with Whites is only beneficial to the 
attitudes of Black South Africans if it is intimate, [whereas] that contact increases 
racial reconciliation amongst Whites, Coloureds, and South Africans of Indian origin, 
regardless of its intimacy'. 

 Yet, social psychologists have not only performed experiments that 
consistently conform to, confirm, and strengthen Allport's fourth condition, they have 
also performed meta-analyses of those experiments, to identify why Allport's 
strengthened fourth condition is so crucial. Most significantly, in their article How 
does intergroup contact reduce prejudice?: Meta-analytic tests of three mediators, 
their meta-analysis of more than 515 studies led Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp 
(2008: 922) to conclude that, in cross-caste 'contact', 'the mediational value' of 
'enhancing knowledge about the outgroup' 'appears less strong than' the mediational 
value of both (a) 'reducing anxiety about intergroup contact' and (b) 'increasing 
empathy and perspective taking'. These two factors explain what is meant by 
reference to 'intimacy', in Gibson and Claassen's strengthened version of Allport's 
fourth condition. Indeed, these two factors show how cross-caste encounters that fall 
short of Allport's strengthened fourth condition fall short of breaking 'stigma'. 

 First, 'reducing anxiety about intergroup contact' is necessary for breaking 
'stigma'. In an article, Relationships between intergroup contact and prejudice among 
minority and majority status groups, Linda Tropp and Thomas Pettigrew (2005: 951), 
drawing upon their meta-analysis of same 515 studies, found that 'the relationships 
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between contact and prejudice tend to be weaker among members of minority status 
groups than among members of majority status groups'. They attributed this finding to 
the fact that, 'for members of minority status groups, an ongoing recognition of their 
group's devaluation inhibits the potential for positive contact outcomes, whereas 
such an effect is unlikely to occur among members of majority status groups'. Tropp 
and Pettigrew's explanation accounts for the racialised asymmetry in the results that 
Gibson and Claassen observed in South Africa. Presumably, among 'Black South 
Africans', there is an 'ongoing recognition of their group's devaluation', that we do 
not find 'amongst Whites, Coloureds, and South Africans of Indian origin'. 
Presumably, from the perspective of 'Black South Africans', these encounters were 
not unambiguously non-hierarchical. On the contrary, these encounters made sense 
in light of the mainstream way of communicating about 'Black South African[...]' 
bodies. 
  
 Second, 'increasing empathy and perspective taking' is necessary for breaking 
'stigma'. Persons racialised-as-black and persons racialised-as-white suffer from 
emotional and perceptual segregation about, for instance, what behavour counts as 
racially stigmatising. On the one hand, in her article Emotional segregation: A 
content analysis of institutional racism in US films, 1980-2001, Angie K. Beeman tells 
us that 'emotional segregation refers to the lack of empathy that exists between 
African Americans and "whites"'. According to Beeman, this lack of 'empathy' is a 
lack of 'understanding and internalizing the emotions another person feels' (2007: 
690). A difference in emotional response to a stimulus is likely attributable to a 
difference in perception of that stimulus. According to Russell K. Robinson (2008a: 
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2803), in an article entitled Structural dimensions of romantic preferences, 
'perceptual segregation' is the phenomenon whereby 'black people and white people 
who observe the same interracial incident are likely to disagree as to whether the 
white person committed discrimination'. This is because, Robinson (2008b: 1093) 
explains, in an article entitled Perceptual segregation, '[w]hile many whites expect 
evidence of discrimination to be explicit, and assume that people are colorblind 
when such evidence is lacking, many blacks perceive bias to be prevalent and 
primarily implicit'. For instance, Robinson reports,  

'according to a CNN poll, 60% of black respondents agreed that, "the 
federal government was slow in rescuing those stranded in New Orleans 
after Katrina because many of the people in the Louisiana city were black." 
Just 12.5% of whites concurred' (2008b: 1100).  

Furthermore, Robinson reports,  

'in 1994, a CBS News/New York Times poll found that roughly 40% of 
blacks, compared to 15% of whites, believed that the criminal justice 
system was biased against [O. J.]Simpson. [ . . . ] The Simpson poll [ . . . ] 
found an even greater difference between blacks and whites when it asked 
about racial bias in the criminal justice system in general: Roughly 74% of 
blacks stated that the criminal justice system generally is biased against 
blacks, while only 22% of whites perceived such bias'.  

Invariably, the white reaction to the discordant black perspective is that blacks are 




 We can understand both black anxiety and perceptual segregation on matters 
of racial stigmatisation in terms of what Curtis D. Hardin and Terri D. Conley (2001: 
8), in their article A relational approach to cognition: Shared experience and 
relationship affirmation in social cognition, call 'the perceived achievement of mutual 
understanding'. According to Hardin and Conley, we develop this perception of a 
'shared reality', because 'shared experience links specific interpersonal relationships 
to specific cognitions, thereby simultaneously binding social relationships and 
maintaining the individual's grasp of a dynamic world'. Although such a cognitive 
bias can clearly be socially beneficial, as Anderson points out, it can also act as a 
'stigma-reinforcing cognitive bias[...]': 

'The shared reality bias leads individuals to align their perceptions and 
judgments with those of ingroup members, especially if the group is based 
on personal affiliation [ . . . ] The shared interpretations of the social world 
that ['whites'] build with their ['white'] peers will tend to exclude blacks' 
experiences. To the extent that blacks are more aware than whites are of 
discrimination and other obstacles to their advancement, insular whites will 
build a shared reality among themselves that underestimates the extent of 
these obstacles. This reinforces dispositional explanations of black 
disadvantage (2010: 46–47). 

Thus, for any cross-caste encounter to suffices to break 'stigma', it would need (a) to 
get us past our anxiety about a supposed difference in our reality, and (b) to get us to 
develop the perception that a shared reality is common to us both. The sense of a 
shared reality that common to all persons racialised-as-white must be replaced with a 
sense of a shared reality that is common to all persons, across the social boundaries 
erected by caste. Thus, from the potential of perceived common humanity and 
interest, to the potential for acquaintance, to the potential for friendship, to intimacy 
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itself (not merely the potential for intimacy), understood as the sense of a shared 
reality, Allport's fourth condition has been revealed to be nothing other than 
Ambedkar's second premise. If a cross-caste encounter does not consist in the sense 
of a shared reality, it does not count—it will not 'uproot Caste' and 'the feeling of 
being aliens[ . . . ]created by [it]'. 

2.1.2.2. Cross-caste kinship 

 However, Ambedkar's first premise is false. It is false that 'Fusion of blood can 
alone create the feeling of being kith and kin'. This premise is false for two reasons. 
First, in 2.1.2.2., I distinguish two interpretations of '[f]usion of blood', two types of 
cross-caste kinship—namely, the procreation of cross-caste children and the practice 
of cross-caste marriage—and I argue that neither can be relied upon to generate 
cross-caste commonality. Second, in 2.2.1., I argue that cross-caste kinship is not the 
only way in which cross-caste commonality may be created, because cross-caste 
commonality can also be created by what I call cross-caste companionship. 

 Like Ambedkar, Croly, too, spoke of 'the necessity of the fusion of the white 
and black' (1864: 18), of 'the ultimate fusion of the negro and white races' (1864: 
60). By this, Croly meant the procreatively sexual 'blending of blood'. So we might 
think that, by the phrase '[f]usion of blood', Ambedkar means the procreation of 
cross-caste children. Yet, cross-caste parents have not achieved a perception of a 
shared reality common to both, simply because they have together produced children 
of so-called 'mixed race'. On the contrary, as Adrienne D. Davis (2003) observes, 
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enslaved persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women often gave birth to such 
children, following their sexual harassment at the hands of their masters—free 
persons racialised-and-gendered-as-white-men. Crucially, these masters did not 
participate in the shared activity of raising these cross-caste children. On the contrary, 
these children were, instead, legally assumed to have the enslaved status of their 
mothers. Indeed, '[t]he South was one of the smallest importers of slaves, but had the 
largest slave population in the West', because '"[t]he perpetuation of the institution of 
slavery, as the nineteenth-century Southerners knew it, rested on the slave-woman's 
reproductive capacity"' (2003: 459, citing White 1985: 79-80). As Adrian Piper wryly 
notes, the result of this procreative phenomenon is that 'the longer a person's family 
has lived in this country, the higher the probable percentage of African ancestry that 
person's family is likely to have' (1992: 17). Yet, despite this extensive '[f]usion of 
blood', a perception of a shared reality does not yet exist across the boundaries of 
caste in the USA. On the contrary, it has generated new, invidious forms of micro-
distinction between racial attributes, among persons of so-called 'mixed race', and 
between those persons and persons racialised-as-black (Piper 1992). Thus, the 
production of cross-caste children has proved unreliable in giving rise to cross-caste 
commonality. 

 However, recall that Ambedkar's assertion of his 'real remedy', the assertion 
that immediately preceded his argument, was about cross-caste marriage, or cross-
caste connubium. It was not about cross-caste procreation, or 'fusion of blood', as he 
so vividly puts it. Thus, Ambedkar's argument, if he was expecting it to yield this 
conclusion about marriage, is invalid. Suppose we give Ambedkar the benefit of the 
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doubt. Suppose that he had not waxed lyrical about 'fusion of blood', but had, 
instead, given us, as his first premise, the proposition that '[Cross-caste connubium] 
can alone create the feeling of being kith and kin'. Would this premise have been 
true? 

 Mill would have rejected the premise. Marriage, in Mill's day, was regulated 
by the law of couverture. According to William Blackstone (1769), who gave what 
became the standard explanation of this law,  

'[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or 
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband'.  

It was against the background of this law that Mill (1851a) made a pre-nuptial 
statement to Harriet Taylor. Mill argued that  

'the whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law [is] such 
as both she and I entirely and conscientiously disapprove, for this among 
other reasons, that it confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal 
power and control over the person, property, and freedom of action of the 
other party, independent of her own wishes and will'.  

In effect, Mill denounced marriage as a social tyranny. Thus, when Mill advocates 
miscegenation as a remedy for social stigmatisation, he cannot mean that remedy to 
consist in marriage. One social tyranny cannot remedy another. 

 However, it might be objected that, since Mill's day, marriage has been 
rehabilitated. Proof of its rehabilitation, the objection might go, is that law of 
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couverture has been repealed. This is unconvincing. First, it would not have 
convinced Mill, who, as we have already observed, believes both that 'the chief 
mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma' and that that 
stigma or 'that odious association lasts'. For Mill, even though the law of couverture 
has been repealed, badges of couverture might still remain. Second, as Claudia Card 
(1997: 322–323) argues, in her article Against marriage, contemporary marriage 
retains even the legal aspects of the social tyranny that Mill espied in it:  

'the legal rights of access that married partners have to each other's persons, 
property, and lives make it all but impossible for a spouse to defend herself 
(or himself), or to be protected against torture, rape, battery, stalking, 
mayhem, or murder by the other spouse'.  

Even more worryingly, in a society in which 'people who do not have independent 
access to an income often find themselves economically pressured into marrying' 
and in which 'the consequences of divorce can be so difficult that many who should 
divorce do not', contemporary marriage threatens to leave persons racialised-











2.2.0. Another plan of action for the abolition of caste is to begin with inter-caste 
dinners  

 Despite Mill's opposition to it, there is something special about marriage. 
Furthermore, Ambedkar thinks there is something special about meal sharing. Indeed, 
Ambedkar asserted that 'Caste will cease to be an operative force only when inter-
dining and inter-marriage have become matters of common course' (1936b: 20.5–6). 
I shall try to understand what truth there might be to what Ambedkar asserted. By 
exploring Mill's notion of 'the ideal of marriage', and its relation to meal-sharing, I 
shall argue that, when these have 'become matters of common course', we will 
succeed in 'killing the [ . . . ] consciousness of caste'. 

2.2.1. The ideal of marriage 

 Mill's 'ideal of marriage' is intimately related to the social value he places on 
meal-sharing.  

 First, consider 'inter-marriage'. Between 2003 and 2004, George Yancey 
(2007: 201) conducted, 'in a Texas metropolitan area[,] twenty-one interviews of 
white partners in [ . . . ] interracial marriages'; '[i]n almost half of the marriages 
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(n=10) one partner was black'. Strikingly, Yancey found that 'Whites married to non-
blacks generally adjusted their racial attitudes because of their interracial marriages'; 
Yancey also 'observe[d] these tendencies among whites married to blacks' (2007: 
203–204, italicisation mine). In 2.2.1.1., I shall argue that cross-caste commonality 
was achieved in these marriages not because they were marriages, but because they 
put the marital partners on an equal deliberative footing. I call a relationship that 
instantiates this feature a 'companionship'. Yancey's data shows that cross-caste 
companionship can create cross-caste commonality. 

 Second, consider 'inter-dining'. In 2004, in South Africa, Gibson and Claassen 
(2010: 269) found that: 'when intergroup contact achieves a level of intimacy 
compatible with meal sharing or true friendships, that contact has substantial 
consequences for the fostering of racial reconciliation'. In 2.2.1.2., I shall argue that 
there is, for Mill, an important link between cross-caste commensality and cross-caste 
companionship: cross-caste commensality can create cross-caste companionship. 

2.2.1.1. Cross-caste companionship 

 Mill distinguishes legal marriage, which he and Harriet Taylor eschew, from 
what he calls 'the ideal of marriage', which he and Harriet Taylor advocate. '[T]he 
ideal of marriage', Mill says, 'would be a common, if not the commonest, case in 
marriage, did not the totally different bringing-up of the two sexes make it next to an 
impossibility to form a really well-assorted union'. By contrast, 'the ideal of marriage 
[ . . . ] often happens between two friends of the same sex, who are much associated 
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in their daily life' (1869: 4.16). Harriet Taylor agrees that 'the ideal of marriage' can 
occur outside of legal marriage: 'The highest order of durable and happy attachments 
would be a hundred times more frequent than they are', she says, 'if the affection 
which the two sexes sought from one another were that genuine friendship, which 
only exists between equals in privileges as in faculties' (1851: 39). In fact, Mill, in an 
early draft of his Autobiography, asserted that, before they were legally married, in 
1851, he and Harriet Taylor Mill enjoyed 'the ideal of marriage', which he called 
'companionship':  

'Certain it is that our life, during those years, would have borne the strictest 
scrutiny, and though for the sake of others we not only made this sacrifice 
but the much greater one of not living together, we did not feel under an 
obligation of sacrificing that intimate friendship and frequent companionship 
which was the chief good of life and the principal object in it, to me, and, 
conscious as I am how little worthy I was of such regard, I may say also to 
her' (1873a).  

Suppose companionship of the sort that existed between John Stuart and Harriet 
Taylor Mill were forged across the boundary erected by caste. How might such cross-
caste companionship succeed in creating cross-caste commonality? 

 On the one hand, cross-caste companionship might create cross-caste 
commonality, because it generates a certain output from shared activity. Mill seems to 
encourage this thought, when he says that, in 'the ideal of marriage', 'each of two 
persons, instead of being a nothing, is a something', when he speaks of 'that union of 
thoughts and inclinations which is the ideal of married life' (1869: 4.15), and when 
he asserts that 'whatever differences there might still be in individual tastes, there 
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would at least be, as a general rule, complete unity and unanimity as to the great 
objects of life.' (1869: 4.16). Margaret Gilbert seems to support this thought. 
Although, like Mill and Taylor Mill, Gilbert asserts that there is 'no obvious reason to 
think that fusion of the kind common in marriage cannot exist without benefit of legal 
marriage', Gilbert nevertheless finds that '[m]arriage is liable to produce an intensive, 
long-term fusion'. Yet, unlike Ambedkar, who spoke of a '[f]usion of blood', Gilbert is 
speaking of a 'fusion of egos'. For Gilbert, if one 'makes explicit references to 
[one]self in terms of "I" and "mine"', then one 'has an ego, or, equivalently, is an 
ego' (1996: 217). For Gilbert, 'two egos may be said to have fused just in case the 
people in question form a plural subject of some kind' (1996: 220). For Gilbert, one 
is a member of a plural subject when one uses the pronoun 'we', where 'we' refers to 
'a set of people each of whom shares, with oneself, in some action, belief, attitude, or 
other such attribute' (1989: 168). This joint 'action, belief, attitude' is the output of 
one's shared activity. Gilbert tells us that 'fusion is a matter of degree', in two 
respects. First, 'two (or more) people can be fused together to a greater or lesser 
extent'; second, '[f]usion can [ . . . ] be of long or short duration' (1996: 221). Mill, 
who takes 'the ideal of marriage' to be a relationship 'of an enduring character, [ . . . ] 
through the whole of life' (1869: 4.16), would understand companionship not as 
moderate and temporary fusion, but as intensive and long-term fusion. Conversation 
is an example of moderate and temporary fusion. According to Gilbert, '[w]hen 
people talk together in conversation, at least when they make assertions as opposed 
to questioning, they 'put up' propositions for joint acceptance or rejection. 
Depending on how others react, a given proposition is jointly accepted or 
rejected' (1989: 295). In this way, a conversation 'generates various views that are 
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jointly accepted at least for the duration of the encounter. These conversationalists 
will, then, be fused temporarily, to a degree, in relation to a certain goal and a certain 
set of views' (1996: 221). Thus, a conversation may be described as 'the negotiation 
of jointly accepted views' (1996: 221n19). By contrast, intensive and long-term 
fusion, Gilbert tells us, is a relationship in which 'the parties have one or more major 
long-term joint projects', and in which, 'over time[,] negotiations take place and 
agreements are reached on a multitude of issues, major and minor' (1996: 222). For 
example, if two unequally racialised and gendered egos, from either side of the 
boundary erected by caste, fuse, intensively and long-term, they are a plural subject 
and might well, for that reason, jointly believe some particular event or action to 
have been racially stigmatising. Thus, since the output of this fusion is cross-caste 
concord on what behaviour counts as racially stigmatising, one might, therefore think 
that a '[f]usion of [egos] can [also] create the feeling of being kith and kin'. 

 On the other hand, cross-caste companionship might create cross-caste 
commonality, because it generates a certain input into shared activity. This alternative 
thought might be prompted as a response to a problem that arises, if one focuses on 
the output from shared activity. The problem is that cross-caste concord about what 
behaviour counts as racially stigmatising could be achieved in a variety of ways. For 
example, the parties to the conversation could accept this conversational output as 
the result of a randomising mechanism. This would be a type of egalitarian input. 
However, the parties to the conversation could also accept this conversational output 
as the result of a majoritarian vote, as the result of an unjust bargain, or even a threat. 
Cross-racial concord that results from such inegalitarian inputs as these cannot be 
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relied upon to creat cross-caste commonality. Thus, surprisingly, it cannot be the 
output of conversation that is the active ingredient in 'genuine' or 'true friendships'. 
Focus, then, not on the state of holding a jointly accepted view, but rather on the 
process of getting to one. Central to what Andrea Westlund calls '[t]he "input" side of 
joint intention' (2009: 2) is what Bennett Helm calls the 'problem of import' (2010: 
262; 266n29): What is so important to true friends that it acts as a normative 
constraint on the way in which they come jointly to adopt some 'action, belief, 
attitude'? Of import to 'genuine' or 'true' friends is the 'conception of [their] 
relationship as one of mutual concern between individuals whose practical 
perspectives are normatively on a par' (Westlund 2009: 16). This is because each 
individual in the 'true friendship' treats some idiosyncratic set of considerations as 
providing reasons for her to act (Westlund 2009: 3n6), and any view that the 'true 
friend[s]' are jointly to accept must be rationally and reasonably acceptable, from 
each individual's distinct, idiosyncratic, practical perspective. Thus, to reject any 
conversational output generated in a way that fails to promote this conception of their 
relationship is to guard against both deference and domination within the 
relationship. It is to keep each party to the relationship on an equal deliberative 
footing. This focus on the input of shared activity makes sense of Mill's argument that 
we adopt a 'principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one 
side, nor disability on the other' (1869: 1.1). Indeed, it makes sense of Croly's 
argument that we 'place the races upon a footing of perfect equality' (1864: 58). 

 We are now in a position to explain how a '[footing of equality] can [also] 
create the feeling of being kith and kin'. A person is biased towards embracing 
86
complaints made by herself as having prima facie plausibility. The default is that, if 
the person thinks that she has grounds for complaint, then, at least to her mind, she 
probably does have grounds for complaint. This motivates a person to seek from 
others a just response to her complaint. In a cross-racial relationship marked by equal 
deliberative standing, the 'map of racial self-interest' has been redrawn (Kennedy 
1997: 819). Each person is biased towards embracing complaints made by either 
member of the plural subject as having prima facie plausibility. The new default is 
that, if either member of the plural subject thinks that she has grounds for complaint, 
then, at least to the minds of either party to that plural subject, that member of the 
plural subject probably does have grounds for complaint. This motivates both 
members of the plural subject to seek from others a just response to the complaint. In 
this way, a cross-caste relationship marked by equal deliberative standing can create 
cross-caste commonality. Indeed, this theory was Yancey's own explanation of the 
data he collected in Texas, in 2004: 'Because of the necessity of establishing healthy 
relationships, it is important that marital partners take seriously the experiences of 
their spouses. This provides whites married to people of color incentive to understand 
the power of racism from the testimonies of their spouses' (2007: 203–204). 

2.2.1.2. Cross-caste commensality 

 According to Ambedkar, '[a]nother plan of action for the abolition of Caste is 
to begin with inter-caste dinners' However, Ambedkar thinks that  
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'[t]his also, in [his] opinion, is an inadequate remedy. There are many 
castes which allow inter-dining. But it is a common experience that inter-
dining has not succeeded in killing the spirit of Caste and the 
consciousness of Caste. [ . . . ] Caste will cease to be an operative force 
only when inter-dining and inter-marriage have become matters of 
common course' (1936b: 20.5–6).  

In 2.2.1.2, I shall argue that, when 'inter-dining', or cross-caste commensality, 
'become[s a] matter[...] of common course', it can reliably lead to cross-caste 
companionship. Since, etymologically, from Latin con-, meaning 'with', and panis, 
meaning 'bread', one's companion is one's 'bread-fellow', I shall call cross-caste 
commensality that paves the way to cross-caste companionship 'cross-caste com-
panion-ship'. In 2.2.2., I shall argue that cross-caste com-panion-ship breaks caste by 
'killing [ . . . ] the consciousness of caste', by transforming, that is, the mainstream 
way of communicating about persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women from 
bed-fellow to bread-fellow. 

 Recall Mill's assertion that one of the 'moral axioms' is that 'every one of the 
living brotherhood of humankind has a moral claim to a place at the table provided 
by the collective exertions of the race'. Mill is speaking, in this string of words, both 
metaphorically and literally. Certainly, Mill equates this 'axiom' to the assertion that 
'every person alive ought to have a subsistence' (1849: 73), so that 'the table' is a 
metaphor for the cornucopia of nature. Yet, Mill also, elsewhere, asserts that granting 
'a place at the table' is, literally, a way in which one expresses human fraternity and 
fellowship with another person. In his essay On Ireland, Mill remarked that '[a]fter 
what fashion men bepraise their friends, the proceedings at any public dinner will 
testify. At such entertainments (next to eating and drinking), the principal purpose for 
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which the guests are assembled, seems in general to be that of receiving assurances 
from one another that they are patterns of every human virtue' (1825: 63). Doubtless, 
Mill thinks that too much mutual praise goes on at such events, but, nevertheless, the 
'principal purpose' of such events is clearly recognitive: 'guests are assembled' in 
order publicly to acknowledge the common humanity of the guests.  

 Furthermore, 'guests are assembled' at meals in order to signal intimacy in 
one's relationship with one's guests. Thus much was demonstrated by Lisa Miller, 
Paul Rozin, and Alan Page Fiske (1998: 423, 427–433). 'In 1992, 69 University of 
Pennsylvania undergraduates (34 men and 35 women) were asked [ . . . ] to answer 
'yes' or 'no' to three separate questions concerning whether they 'share food', 'share 
eaten food', or 'feed or are fed by' people with whom they have various relationships' 
and '150 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (73 male and 77 female) [ . . . ] 
saw a projected videotape of a man and a woman conversing while they ate lunch 
[and] were asked to describe what they had seen and to guess the relationship 
between the two people in the tape'. Miller, Rozin and Fiske found that 'sharing food 
is interpreted as a sign of social intimacy', that 'feeding is a stronger sign of intimacy 
than sharing, and will incline observers to the assumption of romantic involvement, 
in an appropriate context', and that 'consubstantiation [i.e. eating food that has been 
'previously bitten/tasted/touched by another'] enhance[s] the intimacy judgments in 
the context of food sharing'. 

 Miller et alii's insight into the intimate value of meal-sharing and Mill's insight 
into the recognitive value of meal-sharing—or, at least, the intimate and recognitive 
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value that meal-sharing have in a society, such as ours, beset by heteronomative 
white male domination—have explanatory power. First, Miller et al. can explain why 
Gibson and Claassen found that 'when intergroup contact achieves a level of 
intimacy compatible with meal sharing or true friendships, that contact has 
substantial consequences for the fostering of racial reconciliation'. Miller's 
explanation is that, at least in a society such as ours, 'true friendships' just are 
friendships that instantiate 'meal sharing'. Second, Mill can explain why Gibson and 
Claassen found that 'contact with Whites is only beneficial to the attitudes of Black 
South Africans if it is intimate'. To see how, notice that, for their  

'"intimacy of contact" index, [Gibson and Claassen] weighted the[ir] 
friendship responses by the frequency of sharing a meal, adding either no 
"bonus" points for those never sharing a meal with their friends of the 
opposite race, .5 additional points for those who dine with their friends, 
but not very often, and a full point for those who quite often eat with 
friends of another race'.  

In other words, 'contact with Whites is only beneficial to the attitudes of Black South 
Africans', if it is the sort of 'contact' that includes meal-sharing. Mill's explanation is 
that 'contact with Whites is only beneficial to the attitudes of Black South Africans', if 
it instantiates the sort of 'assurances' that, according to Mill, meal-sharing is wont to 
instantiate. These are the sort of 'assurances' that might dispel what Tropp and 
Pettigrew called the 'ongoing recognition of their group's devaluation'. 

 However, not only can the insights of Mill and Miller explain the findings of 
Gibson and Claassen, they also have the distinction of being able to explain both our 
arcane rules of etiquette and our acts of exclusive commensality.  
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 Take rules of etiquette. Norbert Elias, in his The history of manners, found  

'ample evidence to show that[, in the seventeenth century,] customs, 
behavior, and fashions from the court are continuously penetrating the 
upper middle classes, where they are imitated and more or less altered in 
accordance with the different social situation. They thereby lose, to some 
extent, their character as means of distinguishing the upper class [from 
the upper middle class]. They are somewhat devalued. [Crucially, t]his 
compels those above to further refinement and development of 
behavior' (1969: 100–101, italicisation mine).  

We can explain the invention and re-invention of dining etiquette, by the upper class 
of the royal court, as a refusal to signal intimacy with, or to recognise the common 
humanity of, those in the upper middle class, immediately below. 

 Now take exclusive commensality. Persons racialised-as-white have been 
consistently found, at different ages and in different countries, to exclude persons 
racialised-as-black from the dining table. We can similarly explain this phenomenon 
as a refusal, by persons racialised-as-white, to signal intimacy with, and to recognise 
the common humanity of, persons racialised-as-black. The literature consists in data 
for adults, for undergraduates, and for school-pupils.  

 First, take adults. In South Africa, Gibson and Claassen (2010: 266) and, six 
years earlier, James L. Gibson (2004: 139), both found that '[f]ully four of five blacks 
report that they have never shared a meal with a white person'. According to Gibson 
and Claassen (2010: 266), cross-caste 'meal sharing' was 'especially rare among 
Black South Africans'. Indeed, 30.8% of 'Blacks' who reported that they had 'quite a 
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number' of 'White' friends also reported that they 'never share a meal with a White 
person'. By contrast, 'among Whites reporting having quite a number of Black 
friends, only 9.4% has never shared a meal with them'. Gibson and Claassen 
conclude from this data that, 'even when Blacks come in relatively close contact with 
Whites, these relationships are characterized by lower levels of intimacy'. 

 Second, take students. In 2010, Leigh. E. Schrieff, Colin. G. Tredoux, John A. 
Dixon, and Gillian Finchilescu repeated an experiment they had first performed in 
2005 (2005: 441). '[F]rom a balcony over-looking the dining hall', 'in two catered 
residences, at the University of Cape Town', they observed—throughout the 'entire 
the dinner period, i.e. 17h40 to 19h30, in 13 sessions, scattered over three different 
months'—'[a] total of 475 students [ . . . ], of which 159 (33.47 %) were black 
African, 80 (16.84%) Indian, 29 (6.11%) coloured, and 206 (43.37%) white 
students' (2010: 7–8, 13-14). Schrieff et al. 'found marked segregation in seating 
patterns'—which they called 'hyper-segregation'—'in spite of the opportunity for 
socially sanctioned intergroup contact', and their two experiments, five years apart, 
'demonstrate[d] the consistency of segregated seating patterns over time'. 
Furthermore, 'in a cafeteria affiliated to a metropolitan university located in a city in 
the north-west of England' and where '17% [of students] classified themselves as 
having another ethnic origin', Beverley Clack, John A. Dixon, and Colin Tredoux 
(2005: 13) observed seating patterns 'on nine time intervals for 6 days over a period 
of 2 weeks, yielding a total of 45 intervals'. They found that 'interethnic exposure at 
the level of social units—the spaces where customers chatted as friends or 
acquaintances whilst eating a meal—was consistently lower than one would expect 
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under conditions of random mixing[. . . .  ] The majority of individuals sat in units 
comprised exclusively of members of their own ethnic group'. 

 Third, take school-children. In a 'magnet' school, 'in a large urban area in the 
northeastern United States', James E. Rosenbaum and Stefan Presser (1978: 175) 
made a striking observation: 'the black and white students [sitting at the same dining 
table, but] at the boundaries between racial groups tended to turn their chairs so they 
would have their backs, not their sides, directed at the other group. Even at a single 
table, they managed to shift their seats to create the impression of separate tables'. 
Rosenbaum and Presser's observation occurred in a school they described as 
'predominantly nonwhite', but this predominance was unlikely to have been the 
cause of the segregation. For, from a '[c]oding of cafeteria seating patterns', between 
'mid-February' and 'late June', in 'a desegregated school', in a 'Northeastern 
industrial city' in the USA, Janet W. Schofield and H. Andrew Sagar (1977: 132–134) 
found that 'race is an extremely important grouping criterion even for children who 
have chosen to attend a desegregated school'. Similarly, in the cafeteria of a school 
serving a 'mostly middle-class community, primed by liberal professionals and 
activists', Paul Zisman and Vernan Wilson (1992: 206 & 204) observed, 'once a week 
for a three-week period in each month of November, February, and May', the 'table-
hopping' of groups of 'three or more individuals who repeatedly engage in 
meaningful conversation [ . . . ]over a period of time'. They found that, at tables in the 
cafeteria, 'tight-knit groups [ . . . ] tend to discourage cross-"race" interaction' and that 
even 'the cores of integrated groups tend to be segregated'. Again, Clark McCauley, 
Mary Plummer, Sophia Moskalenko, and J. Toby Mordkoff. (2001: 321), in a study of 
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'lunch-table clusters in the cafeteria of a private girls' school', in Pennsylvania, found 
'less Black–White contact among upper-school students (grades 6–12) than among 
lower-school students (grades K–5)'. In her monograph, Why are all the black kids 
sitting together, in the cafeteria?: And other conversations about race, Beverly Daniel 
Tatum explains this relative difference in segregation. Tatum argues that '[i]n 
adolescence [ . . . ] race becomes personally salient for Black youth' in a way that it 
never was, during pre-pubescent childhood. For this reason, Tatum argues, '[b]lack 
students turn to each other for the much needed support they are not likely to find 
anywhere else' (1997: 60). Tatum concludes that, for persons racialised-as-black, 'in 
racially mixed settings, racial grouping is a developmental process in response to an 
environmental stressor, racism. Joining with one's peers for support in the face of 
stress is a positive coping strategy' (1997: 62). 

 The fact that racialised exclusion from cross-caste commensality is rife and the 
fact that commensality signals intimacy and recognition of common humanity, 
suggest that cross-caste commensality could reliably lead to cross-caste 
companionship. Specifically, this reliability lies in two aspects of commensality: in 
what it occasions and in what it promises.  

 Meal-sharing occasions corporeal co-presence and, in our society, 
conversation constrained by a norm of relevance or adequacy. First, through 
corporeal co-presence, a person who inhabits a body racialised-as-white can become 
habituated to bodies racialised-as-black, bodies inhabited by other people. This is 
crucial to destigmatisation. Since stigma is a badge affixed to a human body, person 
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who are to become companionate with each other need to learn to become 
accustomed to each other's human body. Consider how one grows accustomed to the 
lay of a new house, into which one has moved. Over time, one stops bumping into 
walls, doors, and skirting-boards, because one has been practicing the activity of 
conducting one’s life in close proximity to this unfamiliar physical object, i.e. the 
new house. Our practice of physical proximity leads to our becoming physical 
attuned to, and physically at ease in, the new house. Corporeal co-presence achieves 
habituation in much the same way. The only difference is that, in the cross-racial 
context, the unfamiliar physical object around which one practices physical 
proximity, to which one becomes physical attuned, and in whose embrace one grows 
physically at ease, is a unequally-racialised body. Second, at least in our society, 
persons who engage in conversation that is, in the short run, constrained by a norm 
of relevance or adequacy, are in possession of the basis for a conversation that could 
become, in the long run, constrained by a norm that requires each party to the 
conversation to treat the other as her deliberative equal. This is a norm according to 
which the distinctive perspective of the person racialised-as-black and the distinctive 
perspective of the person racialised-as-white are of equal concern, when it comes to 
what can count as an acceptable output of that conversation. Indeed, cross-caste 
conversation constrained by this norm of equal deliberative standing is what cross-
caste companionship is.  

 Meal-sharing promises that this corporeal co-presence and norm-constrained 
conversation with be continued into the future, both regularly and frequently. An 
event occurs regularly, if the time when a subsequent recurrence of that event will 
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take place is easily predicted, by the people who will participate in that subsequent 
event. An event occurs frequently, if it occurs on relatively many, rather than 
relatively fewer, occasions. Call an activity that occurs with regularity and frequency 
continual. For Mill, it is crucial that companionship be built on an activity that is 
continual. For Mill, 'the ideal of marriage' obtains only among persons 'who are 
much associated in their daily life', who engage in 'the constant partaking in the 
same things'—things that count as 'a foundation for solid friendship'. Commensality 
is something in which counts, in Mill's terms, as 'a foundation for solid friendship'. In 
our society, we are constantly and continually eating, on a daily basis. Since we each 
regularly eat—that is to say, the time when we are likely to want to eat is, in 
general, easily predictable by others—and since we each frequently eat—that is to 
say, we eat on very many occasions—it is no addition to the daily schedule of a 
person that she engage in the action of eating a meal. Since the activity of eating is 
no unexpected burden, the activity of sharing that meal is ceteris paribus no 
imposition either. For this reason, continual cross-caste commensality is not only 
reliably companionate, it is also readily available, and morally permissible, in a 
way that many other cross-caste activities are not.  

 It might be objected that dining invitations issuing from individual persons 
racialised-as-white to individual persons racialised-as-black might appear awkward 
at best and patronising at worst. Yet, this is not a problem for cross-caste com-
panion-ship, since we can bring about cross-caste com-panion-ship not only via 
individual invitations, but also within dedicated institutional contexts. The basic 
idea would be to treat formal racial integration not, as it is currently treated, as the 
96
terminus of the integrative process, but as the cradle for informal social integration. 
Just as the racial desegregation of schools and workplaces was once thought liable 
to lead to cross-racial sex and marriage, we might think that institutionalising cross-
racial meal sharing in schools and work-places might lead to cross-caste com-
panion-ship. An example of how this might be done is Mix It Up at Lunch Day, 
popularised by Teaching Tolerance, a Project of the Southern Poverty Law Centre. 
This annual event facilitates, among school-children, the non-awkward and non-
patronising extension of invitations to share meals. Yet, a similar institutional 
framework is also imaginable for adults outside of the workplace. In the decade 
before the laws of Apartheid were repealed in South Africa, persons racialised-as-
black and persons racialised-as-white, in Pretoria and Johannesburg, created 
Koinonia South Africa. This was a Christian and voluntary organisation that put into 
contact with each other unequally-racialised households who each had expressed a 
willingness to engage in cross-caste commensality. It is no coincidence that 
Koinonia is Greek for 'Fellowship': the aim of the South African organisation was to 
facilitate and communicate the public recognition of the fellowship of all South 
African persons. 

2.2.3. Killing the consciousness of caste 

 Given the foregoing argument, it may come as a surprise to learn that 
Ambedkar, in a letter, dated 27th April 1936, to Har Bhagwan of Lahore's Society for 
the Annihilation of Caste, confessed that 'the real method of breaking up the Caste 
System was not to bring about inter-caste dinners and inter-caste marriages but to 
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destroy the religious notions on which Caste was founded' (Ambedkar 1936a). 
However, this is less surprising if we grasp the distinction that Ambedkar drew 
between the source of a social disease and the script to remedy it. In his The 
annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar challenges the Society for the Destruction of Caste: 
'You have located the source of the disease. But is your prescription the right 
prescription for the disease?' (1936b: 20.6-7). What Ambedkar meant, by 'the source' 
and 'the prescription' is clarified in what he says immediately prior to and 
immediately after this string of words.  

 Immediately prior to this string of words, Ambedkar says to his audience that 
'[y]ou are right in holding that Caste will cease to be an operative force only when 
inter-dining and inter-marriage have become matters of common course'. Clearly, 
Ambedkar agrees with his audience that lack of regular and frequent 'inter-dining and 
inter-marriage' is the sustaining 'source' of the 'disease' that is 'Caste'. Yet, 'the 
source' does not directly determine the script. Ambedkar realises this; Anderson does 
not. Anderson asserts that '[i]f racial segregation is the problem, it stands to reason 
that racial integration is the remedy' (2010: 112). One might assume that Ambedkar's 
argument has the same structure: if the problem of 'Caste' is the 'absence of 
intermarriage', it stands to reason that '[t]he real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-
marriage'. However, this is not at all how Ambedkar argues.  

 Recall Anderson's four stages of social integration. Clearly, Ambedkar is 
focused on the Anderson's fourth stage of 'integration'. However, what Ambedkar 
seems to notice, but Anderson does not, is that the fourth stage does not, unlike 
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each of the first three stages, involve the 'destruction of a physical barrier'. On the 
one hand, 'admitting blacks to public accommodations' and 'in the work-place, 
especially government offices, and higher education' both involve the 
'enforce[ment]' of '[a]ntidiscrimination laws' and the enforcement of '[t]he 
authoritarian structure of the workplace', against physical 'resistance' to change. 
On the other hand, the fourth stage involves something quite different, as Ambedkar 
explains to his audience, immediately after the string of words I quoted above:  

'Ask yourselves this question: why is it that a large majority of Hindus do not 
inter-dine and do not inter-marry? Why is it that your cause is not popular? 
There can be only one answer to this question, and it is that inter-dining and 
inter-marriage are repugnant to the beliefs and dogmas which the Hindus 
regard as sacred. Caste is not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line 
of barbed wire which prevents the Hindus from commingling and which has, 
therefore, to be pulled down. Caste is a notion, it is a state of the mind. The 
destruction of Caste does not therefore mean the destruction of a physical 
barrier. It means a notional change' (1936b: 20.7–8) 

Thus, ultimately, Ambedkar is less committed to marital change—what Anderson 
would call 'informal social integration'—than he is to 'notional change', which does 
not even appear as a stage in Anderson's 'typical temporal order'. Although he does 
indeed argue that '[t]he real remedy for breaking Caste is inter-marriage', a closer 
attention to the nuance of Ambedkar's text reveals that 'the right prescription' for the 
'disease' that is Caste is the destruction of the 'notional' barrier that stands in the way 
of 'inter-marriage'. Neither '[a]ntidiscrimiation laws' nor '[t]he authoritarian 
structure of the workplace' can destroy this 'notional' barrier—even though they 
might create the conditions in which tools for its destruction might grow. 
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 Although the 'notions' whose destruction Ambedkar identifies as the proper 
'prescription' are 'religious' and 'Hindu', they need not be. We already know that 
Ambedkar thinks that Caste ranges more broadly than Hinduism. The way to think 
about the 'notions' that underpin Caste is as the mainstream way of communicating 
about human bodies. This is clear from the fact that, for Ambedkar, the destruction 
of these 'notions' is, in fact, not so much a destruction as a 'change'—a change in 
the things that are deemed to be 'matters of common course'.  

 For his part, Mill shares this mutative, rather than destructive, approach to 
tackling stigma. In his review of Albany Fonblanque's England under seven 
administrations, Mill describes 'the main stream of the thought' as 'one simple, 
broad, direct, common-place view of it' (1837: 3). The common-place obviousness of 
what Mill calls the mainstream is what Alexis Shotwell, in her Knowing otherwise: 
Race, gender, and implicit understanding, refers to as 'common sense'. To the extent 
that it prevails in public discourse, an opinion or feeling gains the status of common 
sense. However, this is not to say that, because it constitutes common sense, it also 
constitutes good sense. Admittedly, Mill acknowledged that common sense is 
sometimes congruous with good sense: '[t]he generality of a practice is in some cases 
a strong presumption that it is, or at all events once was, conducive to laudable ends' 
(1869: 1.5). However, Mill thought that, most of the time, common sense is not 
congruent with good sense: 'the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely 
or never the whole truth' (1859: 2.42). Shotwell (2011: 29), quoting Mimi Nguyen's 
(2000) analysis of North American 'talk shows', points to at least one reason why 
there is often lack of congruity between common sense and good sense: 'what 
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appears as 'common sense'—like, 'It's Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve!'—is 
really deeply invested in racial and sexual hegemony'. Shotwell (2011: 33–34) 
explains this investment as follows: 'Common sense conforms to most people's basic 
understandings of their world—that's what it is to be commonsensical. [ . . . ] When 
we have commonsense knowledge, we do seem to know something, frequently even 
in a strong sense of the term "know"—but this knowledge is frequently a product of 
and productive of inequitable social worlds' (2011: 37). Yet, we would not wish to get 
rid of 'common sense' altogether. For, 'part of common sense is the kernels of good 
sense' (2011: 38). For this reason, Shotwell urges on us the project of '[t]ransforming 
common sense' (2011: 38). Similarly, in his Principles of political economy, Mill 
argues that, 
  
'[w]ithout entering into disputable points, it may be asserted without scruple, 
that the aim of all intellectual training for the mass of the people, should be 
to cultivate common sense; to qualify them for forming a sound practical 
judgment of the circumstances by which they are surrounded' (1848: 2.3.2).  

The cultivation of common sense is a matter of changing the mainstream way of 
communicating about human bodies. That mainstream will be changed, 'when inter-
dining and inter-marriage have become matters of common course'. 

 Certainly, Banks had something similar in mind, when he challenged persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women to 'change the script'. Yet, what Banks 
failed to realise was that 'the script' can only be changed by a joint effort: of persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women and persons racialised-and-gendered-in-











White right: 'a right to avoid' 

 It might be objected that Mill could not offer a duty to miscegenate as a 
remedy for the injustice that besets persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women, because his commitment to individual 'Social Liberty' precludes such a duty. 
In 3.1.0., I shall develop this objection, by reconstructing, as charitably as possible, 
Mill's argument for his assertion that 'we have a right to avoid ['his society']'. In 
3.2.0., I shall explore the extent to which that reconstructed argument may be 
harnessed in the objection at hand, i.e. by the recalcitrant who argues that he has 'a 
right to avoid blacks'. I shall argue that, although Mill has not provided us with an 
explicitly sound argument for his assertion that 'we have a right to avoid ['his 
society']', even if Mill had provided us with such an argument, it would not support 
the more particular, racialised assertion that we have 'a right to avoid blacks'. On the 
contrary, I shall argue, Mill's essay On liberty rather startlingly supports the assertion 





3.1.0. We have a right to avoid it 

 In order to reconstruct Mill's argument for the assertion that 'we have a right to 
avoid' the 'society' of anyone, we need to look closely at the language of the passage 
in which Mill makes that assertion: 

'We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion 
of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of 
ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to 
avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose 
the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to 
caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to 
have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give 
others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which 
tend to his improvement. In these various modes [ . . . ]' (1859: 4.5). 

There are at least two arguments that we can reconstruct, from this passage. The first 
argument, which I shall discuss in 3.1.1., is grounded in the premise that 'we have a 
right to choose the society most acceptable to us'. The second argument, which I 
shall discuss in 3.1.2., is grounded in the premise that '[w]e have a right, [ . . . ] in 
various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one'. Of these two 
arguments, it is the second that reflects the more charitable interpretation of Mill's 
text. This is because, as I shall argue in 3.1.3., the second argument can be supported 
by a premise that Mill defends elsewhere in his text, namely, the premise that 'men 





3.1.1. We have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us 

 An argument differs from a string of assertions, because only an argument 
offers (at least) one assertion as the reason for believing that another assertion is true. 
Thus, in reconstructing Mill's argument for his conclusion that 'we have a right to 
avoid' the 'society' of anyone, we are looking for at least one assertion, which Mill is 
offering as the reason for believing that his conclusion is true. Mill seems to be 
offering the assertion that 'we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to 
us' as the reason for believing his conclusion. This is suggested by the fact that Mill 
introduces this assertion with the word 'for'; this word is a subordinating conjunction 
that introduces a cause. Mill is arguing that this assertion causes his conclusion to be 
true. Thus, the structure of Mills's argument would seem to be as follows: 

1. '[W]e have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us' 
Therefore, 
2. '[W]e have a right to avoid' the 'society' of anyone. 

 However, this argument is unconvincing, because, not only is it not valid, it is 
not sound. The argument is not valid, because, it attempts to infer a conclusion about 
avoiding society from a premise about choosing society. We could try to rectify this, 
by inserting a premise about avoiding society. The simplest way of doing this would 
be to insert the following additional premise: 
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1a. If we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us, then we 
have a right to avoid the society of anyone. 

Yet, Mill does not give us an argument for this conditional premise and the 
antecedent of this conditional premise seems false. Both considerations suggest that, 
even if, by the insertion of this additional premise, the argument can be made valid, it 
is unlikely to be rendered sound.  

 The antecedent of this conditional premise is the premise that 'we have a right 
to choose the society most acceptable to us'. This premise seems false, because, on 
the face of it, it tells us that we have the right to associate with anyone we deem 
acceptable to us, whether or not they, in turn, deem us acceptable to them. This 
seems counter-intuitive, because we do not generally think of ourselves as having the 
right to associate with persons who deem us unacceptable to them. In general, we 
think that other persons should have the final say about who gets to associate with 
them, or not. (I say 'in general', because I intend to raise a problem for this intuition, 
in 3.2.0.) We could try to rectify this, by interpreting the premise elliptically: We have 
the right to choose the society most acceptable to us, [so long as those we choose 
deem us acceptable to them]. This would render premise 1 less implausible.  

 However, it would do nothing to defend premise 1a, which is not at all an 
obvious truth. For, even if I concede that 'we have a right to choose the society most 
acceptable to us', so long as those we choose deem us acceptable to them, my role—
to use the examples offered by Phillip Cole (2011)—as a parent, as a 'registrar', in an 
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'adoption agency', as a 'doctor', or as a 'university lecturer' means that, whilst I 
continue to occupy that role, I 'do not have the right to refuse to associate with [just] 
anybody'. This is because, Cole tells us 'I have obligations to associate with family 
members, such as my children', and, more generally, my refusal to associate 'may 
constitute a violation of the rights of others'. The principle here is that 'one's right ['to 
refuse to associate'] varies depending on one's position and role' (2011: 238–239). 

 Thus, given the implausibility of premises 1 and 1a, it seems likely that the 
most obvious way of reconstructing an argument for Mill's conclusion generates an 
argument that is likely to be unsound. 

3.1.2. We have a right to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one 

 Instead of reconstructing Mill's argument from the sentences that succeed 
Mill's conclusion, we might, alternatively, reconstruct Mill's argument from the 
sentences that precede it. However, this is not as straightforward as the previous 
attempt at reconstruction. 

 Consider the clause 'We are not bound, for example, to seek his society'. 
Mill's use of the phrase 'for example' suggests that the clause in which that phrase 
occurs is at least one of the 'various ways' in which '[w]e have a right[ . . . ] to act 
upon our unfavourable opinion of any one'. Yet, the presence of a right (cf. 'We have 
a right') is not the same as the absence of a requirement (cf. 'We are not bound'). We 
can draw upon the 'fundamental legal conceptions' of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld 
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(1913) to explain this distinction. If a person A lacks a requirement to do act q, then 
A has a privilege with regard to q: it is up to A whether or not she performs q. 
Privileges are distinct from claims. If A has a claim against interference with her 
performance of act q, then A has that claim against some other person B. 
Correlatively, there is a requirement upon B not to interfere with A's performance of 
q. Thus, since the sentence 'We have a right[ . . . ] to act upon our unfavourable 
opinion of any one' expresses a claim, it seems a mistake for Mill to offer the clause 
'We are not bound, for example, to seek his society'—a clause that expresses a 
privilege—as an 'example' of that claim. There are two ways in which we could try to 
absolve Mill of this mistake.  

 One argument we could make might be that Mill is using the word 'right', 
loosely, to encompass both claims and privileges. If this is indeed what Mill is doing, 
then the privilege is correctly said to be an 'example' of the 'various' claims and 
privileges that we are said to have. Yet, to make this argument would be to 
misinterpret Mill, who, elsewhere, explicitly defines a 'right' as a claim:  

'When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim 
on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or 
by that of education and opinion. [ . . . ] To have a right, then, is, I conceive, 
to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession 
of' (1861b: 5.23–24).  

 An alternative argument we could make might be that the phrase 'for example' 
governs not just the clause in which it is embedded (i.e. 'We are not bound[ . . . ] to 
seek his society'), but both main clauses in the complex sentence of which that 
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clause is a part (i.e. 'We are not bound[ . . . ] to seek his society; we have a right to 
avoid it'. This argument is attractive because, whereas the clause 'We are not bound, 
for example, to seek his society' expresses a privilege, the clause 'we have a right to 
avoid it' expresses a claim. If both this privilege and this claim are offered as an 
'example' of the 'various' claims we are said to have, then Mill's mistake appears to 
be less devastating. For, on this interpretation, there is at least now a claim that is 
being offered as an 'example' of a claim. However, this argument is also unattractive, 
because it requires that our interpretation of the phrase 'for example' violate the force 
of the semi-colon separating the two main clauses. If we can stomach this violation of 
syntax—and I think that our being charitable to Mill will require us to do so—we can 
reconstruct the following argument: 

3. 'We have a right[ . . . ] to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one'. 
4. One of the 'various ways' of acting upon our unfavourable opinion of 
someone is avoiding their society. 
Therefore, a fortiori, 
5. '[W]e have a right to avoid' the 'society' of anyone. 

3.1.3. Men should be free to act upon their opinions 

 If we choose the second of these two reconstructions, we can more easily 
integrate the reconstructed argument into Mill's theory of 'Social Liberty'. For, 
whereas Mill does not, elsewhere in his essay On liberty, engage in substantial 
discussion about 'a right to choose the society most acceptable to us', Mill does, by 
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contrast, engage in substantial discussion about 'a right to act upon our [ . . . ] 
opinion of any one'.  

 Mill comes closest to discussing 'a right to choose the society most acceptable 
to us', when he discusses the 'liberty [ . . . ] of combination among individuals' and 
the 'freedom to unite' (1859: 1.12). This is the third of three liberties that, according 
to Mill, sit within the 'appropriate region of human liberty' (1859: 1.12). The first is 
the 'liberty of thought and feeling' together with the 'liberty of expressing and 
publishing'. The second is the 'liberty of each individual', which Mill defines as the  

'liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own 
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: 
without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does 
not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, 
perverse, or wrong'.  

Taken together, they comprise a set of liberties with regard to which an individual's 
'independence is, of right, absolute' and with regard to which 'the individual is 
sovereign' (1859: 1.9); they extend to 'the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the 
individual over himself' (1859: 4.1).  

 Yet this tripartite division of the 'appropriate region of human liberty' is 
singularly unhelpful when it comes to interpreting the 'liberty [ . . . ] of combination 
among individuals' and the 'freedom to unite'. For, although Mill dedicates a full 
chapter to the discussion of each of the first and second of these three liberties 
(respectively, chapter two, Of liberty of thought and discussion, and chapter three, Of 
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individuality, as one of the elements of well-being), he devotes only a paragraph in 
chapter five, Applications, to the third of the three. Moreover, in that paragraph, Mill 
is not concerned with the conditions that must be met for 'combination among 
individuals' to be permissible or free—a concern that might put that paragraph on a 
par with chapters two and three. On the contrary, what little we get from Mill on the 
conditions that must be met for free or permissible 'combination among individuals' 
in fact occurs in chapter one, where he asserts that 'the persons combining [must] be 
of full age, and not forced or deceived' (1859: 1.12). By contrast, in chapter five, Mill 
is concerned with individuals who have already combined and to vindicate his thesis 
that, where people 'enter into engagements with one another [ . . . ] it is fit, as a 
general rule, that those engagements should be kept' (1859: 5.11). The upshot of this 
inadequate theoretical attention to the third of the three liberties is that, in chapter 
one and in chapter five, Mill tells us only half of the story: his discussion of our 
'freedom to unite' (1859: 1.12), is left unrelated to what he asserts, in chapter four, Of 
the limits to the authority of society over the individual, as our 'right to avoid' (1859: 
4.5). Is avoidance only permissible among adults who each consent to one of the 
consenting adults avoiding another of those consenting adults? One suspects not. 

 Mill offers a much more helpful division of the 'appropriate region of human 
liberty' in his introduction to chapter three, where he distinguishes the concerns of 
this chapter from those of the preceding chapter. Mill distinguishes, on the one hand, 
the assertion that 'human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their 
opinions without reserve' from, on the other, the assertion that 'men should be free to 
act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either 
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physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and 
peril' (1859: 3.1, italicisation mine). Thus the 'appropriate region of human liberty' is 
bipartite, not tripartite. Within the first of the two parts, the 'liberty of thought and 
feeling' is the freedom 'to form opinions', and the 'liberty of expressing and 
publishing' is the freedom 'to express [one's] opinions'. Mill clearly thinks that the 
seemingly two freedoms are in fact one and the same; he is scathing of the supposed 
'right to [the] freedom [ . . . ] of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing 
them' (1859: 4.19). Indeed, Daniel Jacobson tells us that 'the form of speech relevant 
to speech rights [ . . . ] is not action, for Mill[;] discussion is a mode of thinking, and [ 
. . . ] expression is more like thought than like action' (2000: 282, 284). Now 
consider the second of the two parts. Mill argues that there is a 'diversity of taste' 
among human beings (1859: 3.14) and that 'a person's taste is as much his own 
peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse' (1859: 4.12). Since the sum of one's 
actions upon one's opinions amounts to the trial of an individual way of life, and 
since, as Mill puts it, 'it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can 
produce, well-developed human beings' (1859: 3.10), the assertion that 'men should 
be free to act upon their opinions' is equivalent to the assertion that 'there should be 
different experiments of living' (1859: 3.1), that there should be different 
individualities. Both a 'liberty of each individual' and a 'liberty [ . . . ] of combination 
among individuals' are instruments for ensuring that 'different experiments of living' 
obtain. Thus, the so-called 'liberty [ . . . ] of combination among individuals' is 
merely one of many species of the freedom 'to act upon [one's] opinions'. Yet, it is 
also a species of the most important of the two parts of the 'appropriate region'. For, 
as Mill puts it, '[t]he only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our 
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own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it' (1859: 1.13). 

 The foregoing argument vindicates our preferred reconstruction of the premise 
of Mill's argument. Let us, then, integrate the premise that 'men should be free to act 
upon their opinions' into that argument. As it stands, an argument from the 
proposition 'men should be free to act upon their opinions' to the proposition 'We 
have a right[ . . . ] to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one' is invalid. To 
render the argument valid, we must make three adjustments. First, we must change 
the predicate 'should be free to' into the predicate 'have a right to'. Second, we must 
change the subject 'men' into the subject 'We'. Third, we must introduce an 
additional premise, namely that our opinions include our 'unfavourable opinion'. If 
we are charitable in this way to Mill's text, we can reconstruct the full argument as 
follows: 

1. We have a right to act upon our opinions. 
2. Our opinions include 'our unfavourable opinion'. 
Therefore, a fortiori, 
3. 'We have a right[ . . . ] to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one'. 
4. One of the 'various ways' of acting upon our unfavourable opinion of 
someone is avoiding their society. 
Therefore, a fortiori, 










3.2.0. A right to avoid blacks? 

 You have the right, don't you, to avoid any other person? Mill tells you as 
much. Moreover, because this is your right, it is irrelevant, is it not, what your reasons 
are for exercising this right or what the results will be from your exercising this right? 
Indeed, the fact that this is your right means that you may avoid any other person for 
any reason and with any result. Mill suggested at least two ways in which you might 
understand this right of yours. 

 'Nobody desires,' Mill said, 'that laws should interfere with the whole detail of 
private life' (1861b: 5.13). Contemporary liberal theorists seem to be in agreement 
with Mill, that we have a right against laws that would, if they were enacted and 
enforced, interfere with the 'the whole detail of private life'—especially when that 
'detail' is racialised. For instance, Derek Matravers asserts that 'Fred has no obligation 
to have black friends [ . . . ] nobody is obliged to have a black partner. It is plainly 
ridiculous to maintain that people ought to practice equal opportunities in all areas of 
life' (2008: 1, 5). In the same vein, Christopher Heath Wellman confesses that '[he] 
would expect a black person to be insulted by a racist white who would never 
consider marrying someone who is black, but [he] would not say that this black 
person has a right not to be insulted in this way' (2008: 139). Indeed, he confesses 
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that, 'as much as [he] abhor[s] racism, [he] believe[s] that racist individuals cannot 
permissibly be forced to marry someone [ . . . ] outside of their race'. Wellman seems 
to equate this assertion about the impermissibility of legal coercion with the 
existence of a general moral entitlement: 'the importance of freedom of association 
entitles racist individuals to marry exclusively within their race' (2008: 138). David 
Miller betrays the same concern with 'the idea that we have a deep interest in not 
being forced into association with others against our wishes. It applies most clearly in 
the case of intimate relationships: it would clearly be intolerable if I were obliged to 
share my house or my bed with another person or persons without my 
consent' (2007: 210–211). 

 However, Mill also suggested another way in which you might understand 
your right. By asserting your right to avoid, you might merely be trying to show that 
your act of avoidance is not 'wrong'. Mill tells us that, when we call something 
'wrong', we are referring to 'the idea of penal sanction [ . . . W]e mean to imply that 
a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the 
opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own 
conscience' (1861b: 5.14). Mill's observation suggests that your right to avoid 
anyone, is not just a right you enjoy against any law that might force you to associate 
with a person you prefer to avoid. On the contrary, it is also a right you enjoy against 
social criticism—either from other people, who raise an eyebrow at your behaviour, 
or from that niggling qualm you have in the back of your own mind. In short, no-one 
may make you feel bad for exercising your right to avoid anyone. 
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 We might express your right as the following generalised principle: 

G. For any person P, and for any person Q, P has the right to avoid Q. 

The principle seems reasonable enough, doesn't it? However, from this generalised 
principle, some people infer a racialised result. For instance, some people think it 
follows that, 

R: If P is racialised-as-white, if Q is racialised-as-black, and if P's reason for 
avoiding Q is that P has an unfavourable opinion of 'blacks', then P has a right 
to avoid Q. 

The philosopher Michael Levin gives an example of some people who think we can 
infer the more specific racialised principle from the generalised principle. Levin tells 
us that 'Libertarians will wonder why a right to avoid blacks needs any defense at all, 
since it falls under voluntary association [ . . . ]' (1996: 313). Levin's string of words 
motivates this the third and final section of this dissertation. 

3.2.1. It falls under voluntary association 

 I presume that what Levin's 'Libertarians' mean is that 'a right to avoid blacks' 
is justified by some theory of voluntary dissociation. Yet, what exactly is the theory of 
voluntary dissociation under which 'a right to avoid blacks' is supposed to fall? I shall 
argue that 'a right to avoid blacks' does not fall under any of the three leading 
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contemporary theories of 'voluntary [dis]sociation', offered by Chandran Kukathas, 
Christopher Heath Wellman, and Stuart White. Furthermore, I shall argue that 'a right 
to avoid blacks' does not fall under Mill's classical theory of 'voluntary 
[dis]sociation'. 

3.2.1.1. Kukathas's right to exit 

 According to Kukathas, we should 'see[ . . . ] the right of association as 
fundamental' (1992: 117; 2003: 97). By this, Kukathas means that 'the right to be free 
to leave [is] the individual's [ . . . ] only fundamental right' (1992: 116–117). 
However, a right to exit is not a right to avoid. If I avoid association with you, my act 
of avoidance is performed before I might have become associated with you. My act is 
prospective. By contrast, if I exit some association in which I am currently associated 
with you, my act of exit is performed after I have already become associated with 
you. My act is retrospective. Thus, if Kukathas's theory of voluntary dissociation is 
nothing more than an argument for a right to exit, a 'right to avoid blacks' will not fall 
under it. 








3.2.1.2. Wellman's right to exclude 

 According to Wellman, 'we should always begin with a weighty presumption 
in favor of freedom of association' (2011: 34) and when Wellman speaks of a 'right to 
freedom of association', he means 'a presumptive right to exclude others' (2008: 
114). However, a right to exclude is not a right to avoid. Sonu Bedi suggests why that 
might be. 'Individuals may discriminate', says Bedi, 'but exclusion implies that 
someone is being kept out of something. This, in turn, connotes the existence of some 
group or association. [ . . . ] There is a collective component to such exclusion[,] one 
that seeks to privilege a group or association not a discrete individual' (2010: 434). 
The distinctively 'collective component' of exclusion is the 'group or association' that 
'someone is being kept out of'. We can represent this distinctively 'collective 
component' as a place in the predicate of exclusion. 'P avoids Q', is a binary 
predicate that contains two places available for a name to be slotted in. By contrast, 
'P excludes Q from R', is a ternary predicate that contains three places available for a 
name to be slotted in. The 'group or association' that 'someone is being kept out of' is 
represented by the third variable, R. Yet, the predicate of avoidance does not contain 
that third variable R. Thus, if Wellman's theory of voluntary dissociation is nothing 
more than an argument for a right to exclude, a 'right to avoid blacks' will not fall 
under it. 
Table 4. Wellman's right to exclude 
P Q R
binary (avoid) I you
ternary (exclude) I you from (y)our group
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3.2.1.3. White's white expectation 

 According to Stuart White, '[f]reedom of association is widely seen as one of 
those basic freedoms which is fundamental to a genuinely free society' (1997: 373). 
Stuart White says that there is 'a sphere of intimate association in which it is 
permissible for people to practice whatever pattern of exclusion they like' (1997: 
386). For example, Stuart White tells us, this 'right of intimate exclusion properly 
applies at the individual level, with racist whites refusing to accept proposed dates 
with blacks' (1997: 390). However, a right to refuse an invitation is not a right to 
exclude. Exclusion is a ternary relation, whereas Stuart White's example is a 
description of a binary relation:  

I (one of Stuart White's 'racist whites') refuse a proposal to associate with you 
(a potential dater, racialised-as-black).  

Just like a right to avoid, a right to refuse an invitation is a right both to engage in a 
prospective act and to engage in a binary relation. For this reason, it is worth our 
investigating whether 'a right to avoid blacks' will fall under Stuart White's argument 
for a right to 'refus[e . . . ] proposed dates with blacks'. 

 Strikingly, Stuart White contrasts his binary relation with 'a dating agency 
[that] exclude[s], say, blacks, from its books'. This is a ternary relation:  
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I (a representative of the 'dating agency') exclude you (a potential dater, 
racialised-as-black) from association with us (our group, comprising the 
'dating agency' and its 'thousands of members').  

Notably, Stuart White does not evaluate the ternary relation in the same way he 
evaluates the binary relation. Stuart White argues that, 'for dignity-related reasons, we 
might [ . . . ] think it impermissible for the agency to exclude, say, blacks, from its 
books' (1997: 390). Stuart White explains that 'the mere fact of exclusion from an 
association on categorical grounds can be an injury to [ . . . ] the wider public 
perception of [the individual's] intrinsic worth' (1997: 384). Yet, one wonders why the 
individual's interest in a reputation for having intrinsic worth is dispositive in the case 
of the ternary act of dissociation from 'blacks', but not dispositive in the case of the 
binary act of dissociation from 'blacks'. Why this double standard? Stuart White 
justifies this double standard by appealing to an intuition he expects that we share: 
'[t]he basic intuition is clear and forceful', he says, 'we should all be free to decide 
and control who our friends and lovers [ . . . ] will not be' (1997: 386).  

Table 5. White's white expectation  
P Q R
binary
(refuse a proposal 
to associate with)
I (one of Stuart 
White's 'racist 
whites')




I (a representative 
of the 'dating 
agency')
you (a potential 
dater, racialised-
as-black)
from our group 
(comprising the 
'dating agency' 




 However, Stuart White's intuition is not found to be 'basic[, . . . ] clear and 
forceful' by Laurence Mordekhai Thomas. Thomas has a different intuition. Thomas's 
intuition is that 'the private sphere [ . . . ] is the most important aspect of a person's 
life, considerably more important than the public sphere'. If Thomas's intuition is 
correct, then there is a problem with Stuart White's double standard: 'our 
commitment to ethnic equality,' Thomas says, 'proves to be somewhat disingenuous. 
We judge that a person does no wrong at all in not being concerned with ethnic 
equality in the most important area of her or his life[,] because we hold that equality 
matters only in the public sphere, which is less dear to our hearts' (1999: 196).  

 Furthermore, whereas Stuart White's intuition is one that exonerates 'racist 
whites', Thomas's intuition is one that accuses them of wrongdoing. Thus, there is a 
sense in which Stuart White's intuition is one that it is advantageous for a person 
racialised-as-white to have. The fact that Stuart White is philosopher racialised-as-
white, whereas Thomas is a philosopher racialised-as-black, serves only to strengthen 
the suspicion that this difference in 'basic intuition[s]' is racialised. If Stuart White's 
argument for a right to 'refus[e . . . ] proposed dates with blacks' is nothing more than 
the white expectation that we will all share an intuition that is advantageous to 
persons racialised-as-white, Stuart White's argument will not convincingly support a 





3.2.1.4. Mill's right to avoid 

 Since contemporary liberal philosophers have been so complacent in 
developing a theory of voluntary dissociation that can accommodate a right to avoid, 
Levin's 'Libertarians' might argue that 'a right to avoid blacks' is a right that 'falls 
under' Mill's classical theory of voluntary dissociation. To Levin's 'Libertarians', Mill's 
conclusion that 'we have a right to avoid' the 'society' of someone (i.e. Mill's 
proposition 5) might look like a generalised right to avoid the society of someone—a 
generalised right from which a racialised right might be inferred. However, Mill's 
theory will not permit this inference. Mill does not argue that we have a right to avoid 
someone regardless of our social role, for any reason at all, and with any result. On 
the contrary, Mill attaches a proviso both to his premise that we have a right to act 
upon our opinions (i.e. Mill's proposition 1) and to his premise that '[w]e have a 
right[ . . . ] to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one' (i.e. Mill's proposition 
3). When initially stated, the proviso is 'so long as it is at their own risk and peril'. 
When re-stated, the proviso is 'not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the 
exercise of ours'. If Mill's argument is to be valid, this twofold proviso must be 
attached to Mill's conclusion (i.e. to Mill's proposition 5). Thus, according to Mill, if 
P's act of avoiding Q is an act that poses a risk to, imperils, or oppresses Q's 
individuality, then P does not have a right to avoid Q. Furthermore, according to Mill, 
P has a right to avoid Q only to the extent that P's avoiding Q is necessary for the 
cultivation and exercise of P's individuality. Yet, 'a right to avoid blacks' fails to meet 
the conditions of each part of the proviso. 
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 On the one hand, avoiding the society of blacks oppresses the individuality of 
persons who are racialised-as-black. To see how, recall Mill's proposition 2: Our 
opinions include 'our unfavourable opinion'. The word 'our', here, is ambiguous. 
Presumably, the word 'our' has singular force, such that the proposition really 
expresses something like 'My opinions include my unfavourable opinion'. However, 
on the face of it, the word 'our' is plural and that fact invites me to consider the 
possibility that people other than myself might share my unfavourable opinion.  

 Suppose a critical mass of persons other than myself share my unfavourable 
opinion. Suppose further that they share my unfavourable opinion not as a secret 
thought in each individual's head, but as a common starting premise in public 
discourse. In this case, we may say that my opinion is what Mill called the 'prevailing 
opinion and feeling'. Recall that, if it prevails, then an opinion or feeling has the most 
weight in public discourse. It is the leading current in public discourse. It is the 
mainstream. Importantly, because it prevails, this opinion and feeling informs how 
onlookers understand what is being communicated by the acts and events that 
onlookers witness occurring around them. It informs an onlooker's interpretation of 
those phenomena. An onlooker's 'proposed interpretation' is reasonable, if it make[s] 
sense in light of the community's [mainstream] practices, its history, and shared 
meanings' (Anderson & Pildes 2000: 1525). A stigmatising interpretation from an 
onlooker is all that is needed, to assault and enslave the public reputation of persons 
beset by this mainstream way of communicating about their bodies. 
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 Mill thinks that, at least in the nineteenth century, the unfavourable opinion 
that prevailed about 'blacks' is an instance of social tyranny oppressing the 
individuality of every person racialised-as-black. In Mill's review of Cairnes's The 
slave power, Mill says that,  

'[i]n America, [ . . . ] the freed slave transmits the external brand of his past 
degradation to all his descendants. However worthy of freedom, they bear an 
outward mark which prevents them from becoming imperceptibly blended 
with the mass of the free; and while that odious association lasts, it forms a 
great additional hindrance to the enfranchisement by their masters, of those 
whom, even when enfranchised, the masters cannot endure to look upon as 
their fellow-citizens' (1862: 23).  

Thus, according to Mill, the 'prevailing opinion and feeling' about 'blacks', is that 
they are not 'worthy of freedom' and that they are not 'fellow-citizens'. Wilberforce, 
forty years earlier, and the SCOTUS, only five years earlier, both specified this 
unworthiness of freedom or fellowship in marital terms. Recall Wilberforce's 
observation that 'the slaves are considered too degraded to be proper subjects for the 
marriage institution' (1823: 19–20). The SCOTUS, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 
notorious case of 1857, specified this marital degradation in cross-racial terms. Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney argued that laws against cross-racial marriage 

'show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected 
between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery, and 
governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they 
then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that 
intermarriages between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were 
regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes, not only in the 
parties, but in the person who joined them in marriage. And no distinction 
in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, 




 As Le Bihan demonstrated, 'that odious association', that 'stigma of the 
deepest degradation', still 'lasts'. The mainstream way of interpreting the bodies of 
persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women continues to consist in a code 
associating their bodies with purely pleasurable cross-racial sex and with unfitness for 
cross-racial companionship. Any act, therefore, which, to an informed onlooker, 
'make[s] sense in light of' 'that odious association' will oppress the individuality of 
persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women. The act of avoiding encounters-
that-count with 'blacks' 'make[s] sense in light of' 'that odious association' with 
unfitness for cross-racial companionship. Thus, the act of avoiding encounters-that-
count with 'blacks' oppresses the individuality of persons who are racialised-as-black, 
including persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women. 

 On the other hand, avoiding the society of blacks is an exercise not of 
individuality, but of 'group formation'. We can see that this is so, by comparing Mill's 
theory of voluntary dissociation with that of Hannah Arendt. In her Reflections on 
Little Rock, in defending 'the right to free association, and therefore to discrimination' 
(1959: 52), Arendt argues as follows:  

In 'the social sphere[, . . . ] once we have entered it, we become subject to 
the old adage of "like attracts like" which controls the whole realm of society 
in the innumerable variety of its groups and associations. What matters here 
is not personal distinction but the differences by which people belong to 
certain groups whose very identifiability demands that they discriminate 
against other groups in the same domain. [ . . . W]ithout discrimination of 
some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important 




 Thus, Mill argued that P enjoys a right to avoid Q, because, for some 
particular conception of individuality I, dissociation from Q is necessary for the 
cultivation and exercise of I. By contrast, Arendt argued that P enjoys a right to 
dissociate from Q, because, for some multi-party human relationship R, dissociation 
from Q is necessary for engagement in R. '[A] right to avoid blacks' falls under 
Arendt's theory of voluntary dissociation, because the act of avoiding 'blacks' is the 
process of white 'group formation'.  

 Mill develops the resources to make this point, but it was Franz Fanon, the 
Martiniquan-Algerian psychiatrist, who in fact put these resources together. Recall 
that Mill referred to the protest of the charcoal-carriers as 'their complaint against the 
sort of stigma which had been thrown upon them' (1830: 2). This notion of stigma as 
'thrown upon' another yields Mill's notion of a 'scapegoat'. According to Mill, in an 
unpublished letter defending religious sceptics, a 'scapegoat' is someone 'to whom to 
pass on the slanders thrown upon [oneself], and be able to say to the bigots, It is not 
I, it is my brother' (1851b). Fanon, agrees with Mill that stigma is something thrown 
upon one's body from the outside. Take, for instance, Fanon's description of the 
moment when he hears the words '"Look, a Negro!"': 'It was an external stimulus that 
flicked over me as I passed by', says Fanon. It was 'a hemorrhage that spattered my 
whole body with black blood' (2008/1952: 84–85). Similarly, Fanon agrees with Mill 
that a scapegoat is someone whom one stigmatises in order to construct for oneself 
an identity of innocence. Fanon tells us that  
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'each individual has to charge the blame for his baser drives, his impulses, to 
the account of an evil genius, which is that of the culture to which he 
belongs [ . . . ]. This collective guilt is borne by what is conventionally called 
the scapegoat'.  

However, Fanon completes the work that Mill began, by articulating the 
stigmatisation of racial blackness in terms of the notion of the scapegoat. Fanon tells 
us that  

'the scapegoat for white society—which is based on myths of progress, 
civilization, liberalism, education, enlightenment, refinement—will be 
precisely the force that opposes the expansion and the triumph of these 
myths. This brutal opposing force is supplied by the Negro' (2008/1952: 
150).  

It is presumably for this reason that Fanon tells us that '[t]here is a quest for the 
Negro, the Negro is in demand, one cannot get along without him, he is needed [ . . . 
]' (2008/1952: 135). As Arendt might have put it, the 'very identifiability' of any group 
racialised-as-white 'demands' that some persons be racialised, stigmatised, and 
scapegoated as black. 

 The fact that Arendt's theory captures the sort of voluntary dissociation at work 
in 'a right to avoid blacks' is not a welcome finding for Levin's 'Libertarians'. For, it 
suggests two reasons why there is no 'right to avoid blacks'.  

 First, even Arendt does not think that all 'group formation' is sufficiently 
valuable as to justify 'the right to free association, and therefore to discrimination'. 
On the contrary, Arendt is concerned to prevent the disappearance of 'very important 
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possibilities of free association and group formation'. What, if anything, makes white 
'group formation' a very important possibility? Given that white 'group formation' is 
parasitic upon the social stigmatisation of racial blackness, it is difficult to see any 
significant value in it at all. I will not argue for this point; I merely seek to put the ball 
in the court of Levin's 'Libertarians', to show them the sort of unhappy premise for 
which they will need to argue, if they wish to justify 'a right to avoid blacks'.  

 Second, and more importantly, there simply could not be 'a right to avoid 
blacks'. For, a right to avoid is a right to engage in a binary dissociative relation. By 
contrast, because it refers to an exercise in white 'group formation', via the 
scapegoating of persons racialised-as-black, 'a right to avoid blacks' is a right to 
engage in a ternary dissociative relation; it has what Bedi called a 'collective 
component'. 

Table 6. Levin's 'Libertarians['s]' right to exclude blacks 





I (one of Levin's 
'Libertarians')
you (one of the 
'blacks')
ternary (exclude 'blacks')
I (a person whose 
aim is to racialise 
myself as white)




from our group (of 
persons who are 





I (one of Levin's 'Libertarians') avoid you (one of the 'blacks'),  

the structure is more like  

I (a person whose aim is to racialise myself as white) exclude you (a person 
whom I scapegoat as black) from our group (of persons who are using others 
to racialise themselves as white).  

Thus, 'a right to avoid blacks' is nothing more than a right to exclude persons whom 
one racialises as black from the emerging white racialised group. Libertarians will not 
wonder why a right to exclude 'blacks' needs at least some defence. 

3.2.2. We are not bound to seek his society 

 Levin's 'Libertarians' might concede that Mill's theory of voluntary 
dissociation does not support the assertion that we have 'a right to avoid blacks'. 
However, Levin's 'Libertarians' might retort that, even so, Mill's theory of 'Social 
Liberty' will not support the assertion that we have a duty to miscegenate. Levin's 
'Libertarians' might rely on the fact that Mill says, in reference to someone of whom 
we have an 'unfavourable opinion', that '[w]e are not bound [ . . . ] to seek his 
society' (1859: 4.5). Levin's 'Libertarians' might defend Mill's assertion, by adverting 
to Mill's explanation of 'the characteristic difference which marks off[ . . . ] morality 
in general, from the remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness': 
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'It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may 
rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from 
a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted from 
him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other 
people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it is 
clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other 
things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like 
or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but 
yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; 
we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects 
of punishment. [ . . . W]e call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some 
other term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person 
ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; and we say that it would be right 
to do so and so, or merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according 
as we would wish to see the person whom it concerns, compelled, or only 
persuaded and exhorted, to act in that manner' (1861b: 5.14). 

When Mill spoke of the 'amalgamation' of 'the Irish branch of the human family' and 
'the Saxon race', he merely said it was 'desirable', not that it was 'right'. For this 
reason, Levin's 'Libertarians' might argue, Mill 'would wish to see the person[s] 
whom it concerns' 'only persuaded and exhorted[...] to act in that manner'; Mill 
would not wish to see them 'compelled[ . . . ] to act in that manner'. Yet, '[u]nless we 
think that' amalgamation 'might be exacted from' them, that they might 'rightfully be 
compelled to fulfil' a duty to amalgamate, 'we do not call it his duty'. Instead, Mill 
would merely 'like or admire' those who amalgamated and 'perhaps dislike or 
despise' those who did not. 

 Yet, were Levin's 'Libertarians' to mount this retort, their interpretation of 
Mill's text would be incomplete. A more complete interpretation will reveal that, for 
Mill, miscegenation could be a matter of moral duty (as apposed to 'Expediency and 
Worthiness'), that, for Mill, miscegenation could be a matter of imperfect moral duty, 
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and that, for Mill, miscegenation could be a matter of perfect moral duty and of 
moral right (as opposed to 'generosity or beneficence'). 

 First, Levin's 'Libertarians' argue that amalgamation may not 'be exacted' from 
'the Irish' and 'the Saxon race', that they may not 'rightfully be compelled to fulfil' a 
duty to amalgamate. The suggestion lurking behind this argument is that only laws 
exact or compel action, and laws exacting or compelling amalgamation are morally 
inappropriate. However, although such laws would indeed by morally inappropriate, 
the suggestion that only laws exact or compel action is false. This misguided legalistic 
interpretation of Mill's text—which Hinton told us had been encouraged by Rawls 
and Dworkin—obscures the fact that, at least according to Mill, social criticism is not 
'persua[sion or] exhort[ation]', it is 'comp[ulsion]'. Indeed, in the paragraph prior to 
that from which the passage above is drawn, Mill explicitly rejects this legalistic 
interpretation of what it is to be bound by a moral requirement: 

'When we think that a person is bound in justice to do a thing, it is an 
ordinary form of language to say, that he ought to be compelled to do it. We 
should be gratified to see the obligation enforced by anybody who had the 
power. If we see that its enforcement by law would be inexpedient, we 
lament the impossibility, we consider the impunity given to injustice as an 
evil, and strive to make amends for it by bringing a strong expression of our 
own and the public disapprobation to bear upon the offender' (1861b: 5.13). 

From this string of words, it is clear that Mill thinks that 'a strong expression of our 




 Second, we have an imperfect duty to onlookers. According to Mill,  

'[h]uman beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the 
worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They 
should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher 
faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise 
instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and 
contemplations' (1859: 4.4).  

Thus, we owe to 'each other help to distinguish the better from the worse' ways of 
communicating about the bodies of persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women. It is our duty to offer such help to each other, because  

'[t]o discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which 
it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some 
vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a 
human being can render to his fellow-creatures' (1859: 2.16).  

For this reason, we must be careful about what our actions might reasonably seem to 
express to any onlooker who is aware of the mainstream way of communicating in 
our society (cf. Buss 2001). We must be careful not to perform actions that make 
sense in light of a tyrannous mainstream, and we must be careful to perform actions 
that contribute to cultivating that mainstream. I have argued that we can 'cultivate 
common sense' regarding how to communicate about the bodies of persons in this 
category, if we 'kill[...] the consciousness of Caste'. I have argued that we can 'kill[...] 
the consciousness of Caste', if we engage in cross-caste com-panion-ship. Thus, in 
the absence of any alternative morally permissible, readily available, and reliably 
companionate way of 'discover[ing] to the world' this 'cultivat[ed] common sense' 
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that 'deeply concerns it', we owe onlookers the help that only—as far as we can tell
—our engagement in cross-caste com-panion-ship can bring. 

 Third, we have a perfect duty to persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women. According to Mill,  

'duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative 
right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are 
those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right'.  

When Mill speaks of 'a correlative right', he is referring to 'the idea of a personal right
—a claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law gives when 
it confers a proprietary or other legal right'. (Notice that, for Mill, 'personal right[s]' 
do not consist solely in 'legal right[s]'—there are non-legal 'personal right[s]', too—
and that, for Mill, a 'personal right' may be enjoyed by 'more' than 'one [ . . . ] 
individual[...]'.) Persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women have a right that 
we seek the society of persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women. Indeed, it is 
because this 'personal right' exists, that we can describe what besets these persons as 
not a lack of 'generosity', nor a lack of 'beneficence', but an 'injustice': the injustice 
of tyranny. According to Mill, the 'distinction [ . . . ] which exists between justice and 
the other obligations of morality' is that  

'injustice consists in [ . . . ] a wrong done, and some assignable person who 
is wronged[. . . . A] right in some person, correlative to the moral 
obligation[ . . . ]constitutes the specific difference between justice, and 
generosity or beneficence. Justice implies something which it is not only 
right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can 
claim from us as his moral right. No one has a moral right to our generosity 
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or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues 
towards any given individual' (1861: 5.15).  

Persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women have this right, because they have 
a right not to suffer serious and preventable harm and because we have a duty to 
prevent serious and preventable harm to other persons. In the first chapter of this 
dissertation, I showed that the harm caused by the tyranny of the mainstream that 
besets persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women is serious. Indeed, I showed 
that, by acting in ways that 'make sense in light of' this mainstream, we 'strengthen 
the social stigma' and, thereby, wrong persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women. In the second part of this dissertation, I showed that the harm caused by the 
tyranny of the mainstream that besets persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-
women is preventable. At least one of the ways in which we can prevent this tyranny 
is by engaging in encounters-that-count with persons racialised-and-gendered-as-
black-women. Thus, we have a duty to prevent this serious harm and our duty is 
correlated with a right that persons racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women have. 

 Anderson would likely disagree with foregoing argument. Anderson argues 
that  

'individuals acting out of warm feelings for ingroup members in the context 
of personal relations of friendship and intimacy do not demean outgroups or 
otherwise act unjustly. Outgroup members are not morally entitled to 
demand that these individuals befriend them. This does not mean that such 
conduct is beyond moral criticism. It contains the seeds of injustice, since it 
may spread its effects beyond the sphere of intimate relations and may lead 
to categorical inequality, prejudice, and stigma' (2010: 20-21).  
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I have already shown that 'individuals acting out of warm feelings for ingroup 
members in the context of personal relations of friendship and intimacy' could 
reasonably be interpreted, by an onlooker, as doing something that makes sense in 
light of the tyrannous mainstream way of communicating about the bodies of persons 
racialised-and-gendered-as-black-women. On this point, Anderson is mistaken. 
(Curiously, Anderson's mistake is revealed by her own theory of expressive action.) 
However, I can grant Anderson that '[o]utgroup members are not morally entitled to 
demand that these individuals befriend them'. For, all I have argued is that 'outgroup 
members' are entitled to have their society sought by ingroup members. Continual 
cross-caste commensality is not friendship, even if it can be relied upon to tend in 
that direction. Yet, where Anderson and I seem to agree, is that 'such conduct is [not] 
beyond moral criticism'. Indeed, in agreeing with Anderson on this point, I need not 
disagree with Mill that 'the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in 
so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself'. For I have already 
established that actions that make sense, to an onlooker, in light of a tyrannous 
mainstream concern the interests of the persons beset by that tyranny.  

 However, given the dominant legalistic interpretation of liberal theory, we 
might wonder what a 'moral criticism' of those who fail to fulfil their duty to 
miscegenate might look like. At least one way in which to engage in moral criticism 
is to generate 'moral distress' (Waldron 1987), by publicly demanding that a person 
justify an act or omission in her private life (Allen-Castellitto 2003). Such a moral 
criticism could be framed as a criticism of relational egalitarianism—and I shall 
conclude by sketching just such a moral criticism. Persons racialised-as-white who 
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espouse relational egalitarianism for their social institutions ought also, on pain of 
inconsistency, to espouse relational egalitarianism for their individual decisions. In 
his article, Split-level equality: Mixing love and equality, Laurence Mordekhai Thomas 
(1999) does for Anderson's (1999) theory of relational egalitarian justice what Gerald 
Allen Cohen (2001), in his If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich?, did for 
John Rawls's A theory of justice. Just as Cohen noted that Rawls's distributive 
egalitarian justice was undermined—non-existent, even—in the absence of a 
distributive egalitarian ethos, informing individual decision-making, so Anderson's 
relational egalitarian justice is undermined, and will fail to obtain, in the absence of a 
relational egalitarian ethos. Cohen thinks that Rawls's Difference Principle, properly 
understood, regulates not merely the basic institutional structure of society, but also 
the decisions of rich individuals. Similarly, Anderson's (2007) principle requiring the 
racial integration of democratically necessary elites, properly understood, regulates 
not merely the composition of elites atop of institutions that form the basic structure 
of society. No, it also regulates the composition of elites atop of social groupings that 
are not part of the basic structure. What does this mean in practice? Thomas poses the 
rhetorical question:  

'How seriously can we be about equality in the public sphere if we believe 
that it is morally permissible to privilege our own ethnicity as a matter of 
principle in the private sphere and therefore in forms of social interaction 
regarded to be far more important—namely, ties of romance and 
friendship?' (1999: 195).  

Thomas's reworking of Cohen might be put in the following way:  
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